

**Jairo Enrique
Gallo Acosta**



A bacano psychoanalysis

Subversive, revolutionary, joyful



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Jairo Gallo Acosta.

Psychologist and psychoanalyst. Master's degree in Psychoanalysis, John F. Kennedy University of Argentina. PhD in Social and Human Sciences, Pontifical Javeriana University. Postdoctoral stay at the San Nicolás de Hidalgo University of Michoacana. Professor and researcher at the Cooperative University of Colombia and the National University of Colombia. Author of the books: "Psychoanalysis and Social Theory" (2009); "Psychoanalysis, Research and Subjectivity" (2011); "Polis and Psyche. Essays on Social Theory and Psychoanalysis" (2017); "Clinic and Event. Psychoanalytic Practice in the Age of Neoliberal Logic" (2019); "Ideology, Mental Health and Neoliberalism in Colombia" (2020); For a Motley Psychoanalysis (2021); Love, Emptiness and the Feminine (2023). Teacher discomfort and psychoanalytic listening devices in the educational field (2025). Member of the Caribbean Psychoanalytic Circle

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Gallo Acosta, Jairo Enrique
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Traversing an analysis makes living possible

Could it be that we suffer from an excess of reality?
Let's dream more, let's fantasize more, let's build
another reality!

What is a revolution for if not to love, to desire, and
to live?

To my dad who did everything he could, to my mom who continues to do it

Prologue

Psychoanalysis - Theory Dancing with Praxis

From Colombia, but also from what we have in common across our Latin American territory, Jairo Gallo's book advocates for movement within psychoanalysis, speaking of a psychoanalytic theory and praxis situated in the thought of the relationship between desire, subversion, and joy.

Because we are viewed as “non-European and non-North American” countries, we share a history of colonization that today shapes our economy, our language, our customs, and our media. This colonization is sustained by large disciplinary institutions that, far beyond the military and schools, also affect the way we practice clinical work, how we make and view films, series, and advertisements, and how we are invaded by the strong hand of social media, such as Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter (even knowing about the forms of control exerted by the great global leaders through these platforms).

Thus, psychoanalysis can only be counter-colonial if it “de-northing” (*desnorteada*), if it rotates the alienating senses, pre-fixed as flags of possession of the world between North and South. For Emiliano David, Cristina Vicentin and Lia Schucman (2024, p.3), “de-northing” seems to indicate a sharp perception of the subordination of madness to the “North” in two directions: that of the epistemological subordination of the South to the North in the form of a Eurocentrism; that of the subordination of madness to the

norm of reason and Western rationality”. By bringing the “*bacano* psychoanalysis” into dialogue with Brazil, we can understand that part of the revolution proposed by Gallo precisely questions colonial rationality, held as the sole reason, in a commitment to joy and desire as forces to confront the neoliberal practice of normalizing bodies, minds, and affects.

Neoliberalism, which erases the political potential of the community, generates the melancholization of the population, who believe that nothing is possible beyond consumption. Thus, one of the main characteristics of this system would be the depoliticization of society, withdrawing power from political groups, such as unions, while favoring individualism and the idea of the subject as an entrepreneur of the self. In this model, business management principles (Dardot & Laval, 2016) are adopted for the management of psychic suffering, and the ideals of performance, investment, profitability, and self-positioning, as a brand, are adopted as a psychological decree.

This economic control, also pointed out as a form of rationality, is for Safatle (2022) a continuation of psychology, a true moral economy that conceals a political structure that organizes rulers, actions, public policies, and social relations. That is, it is a politics of ways of living, of producing subjectivities and consequently also of desiring.

Through psychoanalysis, which proposes *not all*, Jairo maintains that joy can confront the melancholization of our field. The mechanism of analytical disidentification suspends not only the singular alienation of the family scene

but also of the social scene, allowing desire to emerge as a revolutionary possibility of questioning norms.

In this sense, desire, based on Lacanian psychoanalysis, is essential for us to think about both singularity and movement. For Lacan, "man's desire is the desire of the other," and in this sense, it relates to recognition, as the subject locates their desire through the other, their fellow human being, who lends them fantasies to conceal the missing object. Desire, therefore, mobilizes us beyond the imaginary completeness of identity. Thus, recognition, as the desire for the desire of the other, can be understood in a broader context, both as.

The inscription of a given subjectivity in culture, and the perception that it will never be complete, because desire insists on breaking the planes in an eternal impetus to *un-know* oneself in order to reinvent oneself, once again piercing and surprising what is expected (Martins, 2019, p. 135).

Contemporary psychoanalysis emphasizes the idea that the territory leaves marks on the culture, which in turn is part of the symbolic world of each subject—a subject who, even while making a singular history, is language, and, therefore, is supported by signifiers whose materiality is made by the acoustic image marked by our sway, by our accent, and by our rhythms. Thus, the author positions himself as subaltern, recalling the Indian Spivak (2010), he says "a subaltern cannot be heard, so it is necessary to seek ways to do it, even though I am also Caribbean like another Fanon, not from the French Caribbean, but Spanish, but ultimately Caribbean, of those indigenous people who never

allowed themselves to be conquered by the Spanish and other European colonizers, which is why they had to invent a European cannibal fantasy, animalizing the native they could not appropriate." This localization not only presents the author but also the position of his work in a stream of psychoanalysis that champions subversion and resistance as a psychoanalytic ethic of a desire that does not conform, does not adapt, and cannot be dominated.

In Brazil, as in Spanish-speaking Latin American countries, psychoanalysis is not only for the elites, as the European phantasm wants us to believe. It infiltrated health policies and gave rise to the Psychiatric Reform, joined hands with the Unified Health System (*Sistema Único de Saúde*) and helped create the Singular Therapeutic Project, a care plan that considers the particularities of the people attended. Psychoanalysis is also outside of institutions, assisting in squares, abandoned stations, settlements of the Landless Workers' Movement (*Movimento Sem Terra*), housing occupations, and even in churches. Estevão and Hartmann (2024, p. 87) also tell us that both in public policies and in street projects, this psychoanalysis in the territory offers us "other ways of thinking about transference and interventions that we can call typically Brazilian," or here we could think typically Latin American.

The topic of Latin American specificities is not new; already in the 80s, the feminist and anthropologist Lélia Gonzalez (2018) wrote "The Political-Cultural Category of Amefricanity," in addition to the text "Racism and Sexism in Brazilian Culture," texts in which the author calls Brazil Latin Amefrica, in an act that subverts the racist symptom of

covering up and silencing our African and Latin origin, which returns as a symptom in our culture. Thus, Gonzalez creates new words to rename our language based on Brazilian territoriality and calls it "Pretuguês" (a portmanteau of *preto* - black, and *português* - Portuguese), also giving body, history, and color to what might be considered empty signifiers. Gonzalez continues by unifying in her self-designation that creates confusion when the real gives way to the imaginary, "and even before, in the so-called Pre-Columbian America, it already manifested itself decisively marking the culture of the Olmecs, for example (Sertima, 1976). Recognizing it is, ultimately, recognizing a gigantic work of cultural dynamics that does not take us to the Atlantic side, but brings us from there and transforms us into who we are today: Amefricans" (2018, p. 333).

Gallo dialogues with our Latin America, from on top of this territory, through the praxis of "a *Bacano* Psychoanalysis," thus leaving me with a first challenge, which was to translate that word into our "Pretuguês." I discovered that the word "bacano" in Spanish does not appear in translation dictionaries, but the word "bacana," exists in the feminine form, and can be translated as beautiful, good, dedicated, dignified, honest, and useful. In the book itself, I found the meanings of "Bacano" as *legal* (cool), *cool*, *gay*, and *happy*, meanings that seem to correspond to our feminine form of "bacano." Thus, we can say that in Latin America the signifier of Bacano, from Gallo's perspective, is woman, *not all*, and in movement.

According to Gallo, "whitewashing in psychoanalysis [is] having the approval of the European master. We seek the

recognition that will not come," and I continue to quote, "praxis can emerge as a symptom, defending a pure psychoanalysis." In this way, we can understand that the passionate defense of the psychoanalysis fixation with both feet on European ground is a symptom that transforms it into an old stone, uninteresting to young people who seek to understand their dancing ways of life in current rhythms. What would be pure psychoanalysis in Gallo's text is understood as a psychoanalysis astonished by the ideal of the unconscious phantasm "whitexican" (in a word created by the author).

The book serves as a reminder for some psychoanalysts who forgot what psychoanalysis is, and the importance of going beyond affiliation, fidelity, rhetoric, and recognition; just as Estevão and Hartman (2024) tell us, "analysis is only possible in the living moment of the act, and not in representation" (p.88). Gallo shows us that we are asking too little of psychoanalysis; the mere freedom to cite non-psychoanalyst authors—or even psychoanalysts from different approaches—requires a request for license, accompanied by a threat of exclusion.

In this sense, *Bacano Psychoanalysis* would also be a resistance to the colonization of psychoanalytic theory by the North, and what the author does is to call us to think about the ways in which we have been colonized in psychoanalysis, placing France and Europe in the place of the colonizer, and French psychoanalysis in the place of truth, as an ideal to be reached. The same traditional psychoanalysis, which criticizes movements that strategically use identity in politics, succumbs to the

tyrannical superego, limiting psychoanalytic praxis to the language and texts of the matrix, while criticizing the very science that places the text of the psychoanalytic masters in its place.

In conclusion, the *Bacano* psychoanalysis proposed by Gallo reminds us that we are desire, and that this is movement; we resume its dancing potential, which invokes the joyful creation of the act, against the neoliberal melancholy that paralyzes. Here in Latin America, we dance, we fight, and, at the same time, we play with diverse rhythms. We create our Borromean knot between race, class, and gender in a singular *sinthome* of psychoanalysis in our territory, with the richness of regional flavors, the beauty of tropical colors, and the sway of our music, which from South to North will not let us stop moving.

Aline Souza Martins São Paulo, May 21, 2025

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Introduction

Freud was missing the tropics!

Ramón Illán Bacca

Introducing the *bacano* into psychoanalytic praxis is a Caribbean boldness, ¡no joda, tronco de frase: un psicoanálisis bacano! (A Caribbean expression roughly meaning: "Wow, what a great phrase: a *bacano* psychoanalysis!"). One could say this in Barranquilla (that Caribbean city in Colombia). The truth is that this title occurred to me while thinking about something more theoretical: how to conceive a psychoanalytic praxis that allows for an exit for the subject in the era of neoliberal capitalism? An exit that does not involve narcissistic cynicism (*narcínica* according to the neologism invented by the French psychoanalyst Colette Soler), nor a tragic resignation to "the fall of ideals," to place oneself above them, or above the clamor of an era to become encysted in a distant, *divaniada* (couch-bound) clinic, far from a reality (which, however imaginary, is also symbolic and has effects on the subject and their subjective productions), under the premise of defending a "pure" psychoanalysis. Faced with the previous question and the multiple elaborations, an answer occurred to me: A *Bacano* Psychoanalysis!

A *bacano* psychoanalysis is nothing more than a psychoanalysis that bets on a *gay saber* (joyful knowledge), which does not mean a self-imposed happiness as intended by the neoliberal capitalist logics of: everyone happy and successful!—a happiness that only leads, as philosophers

Byun Chul Han, Franco Berardi, or Slavoj Žižek himself have reminded us, to generalized depression or anxiety for not being able to reach the superego ideals of neoliberal capitalism. This *gay saber* or joyful knowledge is that possibility of thinking of human tragedy not as an infinite condemnation, but as a possibility of doing something different with that human tragedy, something else, for example: living better through a tragicomedy.

The *bacano* is neither an essence nor much less a standard, nor is it limited to a geographical place, nor even to certain people; it is truly about an ethical-political commitment, it is what allows links with another, enabling social bonds. *Bacano*, like every signifier in Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, is what represents a subject before another signifier. *Bacano* itself means nothing on its own; it will only signify something *a posteriori* if we link it with other signifiers such as joyful, *chévere* (cool), pleasant, committed, contextual, political, ethical, subversive, motley, which is what this book intends.

A *bacano* psychoanalysis in the era where everything is possible but nothing is done, where the end is inevitable for many, where one only has to enjoy, since there is no tomorrow, nor future, because everything is a mortifying perpetual present. It is there that *bacano* psychoanalysis enters to be able to say to the depressing imperatives of "nothing is possible": something is possible, there is always something to be done/to be, there is always something that is not lost: and the subject of the unconscious, the one that Freud discovered, reminds us of this at every moment, just as the hysterics of the 19th century that Freud listened to

reminded us, and just as those depressive and anxious bodies of the 21st century remind us when they take to the streets to march and protest, and who today are entrenched in many universities around the world to demonstrate against the massacre in Gaza perpetrated by the State of Israel, and in Argentina against the neoliberal measures to eliminate what little remains of a welfare state represented in public universities or health, or in Colombia to demand a more inclusive, democratic, and public education as something for many, and not as something for few.

A *bacano* psychoanalysis is a praxis that takes into account the desire of the subject, without denying that there is always an enjoyment for which we must take responsibility. So, in psychoanalytic praxis is where we can, via love (transference), allow the subject to trace their desire through their sayings and silences, a tracing that can place a limit on *jouissance* (enjoyment). Love creates a veil on the object of *jouissance* so that it becomes an object of desire; that is the erotic side of love. A *bacano* psychoanalysis is not something *fun* per se; rather, it is something; it is doing something with desire from the Freudian fantasizing¹ to create possibilities for life. It is a praxis where fantasy is not something pathological, but a possibility to do something with the real of life, with the subject's constitutive emptiness. Faced with the imperatives to exploit, violate, win, triumph, produce, consume—all actions to "be in a reality"—other acts emerge that are constituted through fantasizing, dancing,

¹ Freud, S. *Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming*, in: Complete Works. Volume IX. Amorrortu.

singing, walking, moving, but above all, loving; let's fantasize more, let's move away from reality.

“Humans are very strange. Everything you create is used for destruction,” a phrase that shows the climax of the movie: “The Fifth Element,” to which one could answer from Lacan (2013) in Seminar 10: “Anxiety”: “only love allows *jouissance* to condescend to desire.” Love, in the face of the fatal destiny to which an unlimited *jouissance* leads us (the technological capitalism of the 23rd century in the film), love bravely places itself as the only thing that can make that deadly *jouissance* give way to desire, that which always leaves an open door where everyone will have to make a bond with another.

It is not just about undergoing an analysis that accounts for the real, but that the real accounts for the imaginary and the symbolic; thinking the imaginary from the symbolic to account for the real would be a first moment of an analysis, but a second turn is to move from the real to the imaginary and the symbolic². This last is what could be thought from the tropics to psychoanalysis, with a Caribbean and Latin American touch to psychoanalytic praxis, linking the real to the symbolic and imaginary.

Psychoanalysis is a joyful subversion; it promises nothing; it is the enthusiasm of never being able to reach the desired, it is the joy of living insisting on something that is impossible, but which creates possibilities, the sweet indestructibility of desire that is potentiated by never

² These ideas are products of conversations with Professor María Alejandra Tapia Millán at the National University of Colombia.

reaching the desired; that is why psychoanalysis is *bacano*. Finally, for Lacan, the position of the psychoanalyst approaches that of a saint, "The more saintly we are, the more we will laugh: that is my principle; it is even the way out of the capitalist discourse which, if it is only for some, will constitute no progress" (Lacan, 2012, p. 546).

This book is divided into two parts, the first, *A Bacano Psychoanalysis*, the second, *A Bacano, Variegated, Subaltern Psychoanalysis*. The first part is to conceive a psychoanalytic praxis that not only serves to maintain psychoanalytic endogamy—a psychoanalysis for psychoanalysts—but a psychoanalytic experience for a subject who desires to be heard. The second is that the *bacano*, as already stated, is nothing other than an ethical-political commitment, where we are not afraid or fearful to propose that in Colombian and Latin American contexts we can make praxis an experience that can be recognized as the one they do in France or England, but for that, first we have to recognize it *ourselves*.

A *bacano* psychoanalysis is not about accepting reality or adapting or cynically denying it, it is about recreating a reality and making something else out of it. As I write this, drums, flutes, maracas, trombones, trumpets, timbales, and other instruments are heard in the background. This book alludes to those Antillean, Caribbean, Latin American rhythms, but also those from other places, because a *bacano* psychoanalysis includes rhythms and melodies from many places and many subjects, so that they can be heard and danced here and there. The analytical experience is the listening to the rhythms and melodies of the

unconscious, to the subject's free associations that say something about themselves, and the place of the listener is the floating attention that dances with those sayings, and while this happens, a joyful, subversive analytical act is established.

1.

A Bacano Psychoanalysis

1.1. It's joy, not happiness!

Happiness was never important. The problem is that we don't know what we really want. What makes us happy is not achieving what we desire, but dreaming about it. Happiness is for opportunists. So I think the only life of deep satisfaction is a life of eternal struggle, especially the struggle against oneself. If you want to stay happy, just remain stupid. Authentic scholars were never happy; happiness is a category of slaves.

Slavoj Žižek. *The Guardian*

The signifier *bacano*, in this book, relates more to Spinozian joy than to the neoliberal happiness currently promoted: everyone happy while the world falls apart. This joy is a political-ethical act, where being joyful is necessary to think about—and be in—the world. Joy in Spinoza is one of the three primary affects along with desire and sadness (Spinoza, 2000). Joyful knowledge (*saber alegre*) in psychoanalytic praxis is nothing other than embracing the subject's uncertainty, that which cannot be predicted, but neither can it be condemned; the words spoken are listened to so that a subject may retroactively hystorize³ their past into a future.

³ Neologism between historicizing and hystericizing.

Joyful knowledge is that know-how to turn impotence into an impossible thing in order to create a possibility, something that neoliberal happiness, based on the foundation that "everything is possible," seems not to bet on. Laughter could be a way to process *jouissance* (enjoyment); it is the way to signal that there is a limit that cannot be crossed: that of incompleteness. The consequence of taking the real of life as a comedy through humor is a know-how that uses the symbolic to imaginarily link with another, and thus laugh at the unbearable nature of the real—together we can laugh at the heaviness of existence, at its limitations, where the not-all allows one to transform, subvert, and recreate. To live is to make joy out of impossibility.

Only a subject can inhabit a world; being-ness is a subjective matter where the subject's singularity comes into play with others. Kusch's (1978) refers us to a subject who never finishes being, and that this being is not something finished, but can only be in the act, being-ness between one signifier and another, and in this play, a subject can laugh at the inability to be in order to be-ness and to be able to inhabit and be inhabited, by themselves and by others.

For the above, psychoanalysis must not be made into a museum; as Agamben (2005) tells us, this presents an impossibility of using it, inhabiting it, or making experience of it. Psychoanalytic praxis must be transformed into an experience that cuts across stereotyped and fixed knowledge, enabling the experience that recreates psychoanalysis as a new signifier in every praxis. A *bacano* psychoanalysis is a popular psychoanalysis, not exclusive to an elite that can afford it.

A *bacano* psychoanalysis is knowing how to deal with death to endure life. In Lacanian theory, death is of the symbolic and life is of the real; it is as if by doing something from the symbolic—symbolizing death—we could endure the real of life.

Psychoanalysis makes life simpler again. We acquire a new synthesis after analysis. Psychoanalysis reorders the tangle of scattered impulses, tries to wind them around their spool. Or, changing the metaphor, psychoanalysis supplies the thread that leads the person out of the labyrinth of their own unconscious (Viereck, 1926, paragraph 35).

Passing from *paila*⁴ to *bacano* could be traversing psychoanalysis. *Estar paila* is being in the filth, it is the resignation that nothing can change, it is deadly hopelessness, it is being in an infernal situation, to be in trouble. So, moving to *bacano* would be confronting this *paila* situation, this unlimited suffering. being *pailander* is being able to move from that place to a pleasant one; it is the power of sweetness as Dufourmantelle tells us: "expressions of an authentic life." A *bacano* psychoanalysis is a psychoanalysis for an authentic life.

What is a *bacano* psychoanalysis? It is a psychoanalysis that does not turn psychoanalytic texts into dead letters, a psychoanalysis that is always recreated with every space where a subject emerges from their saying and, by being listened to, listens to themselves. A psychoanalysis

⁴ "Paila" in Colombian popular slang is used to indicate that something is very bad.

that makes theory a game that surprises us from its reading and allows itself to be surprised in its praxis, a psychoanalysis that locates us as subjects in that encounter-discounter with the unconscious, a joyful and courageous knowledge that traces a path of desire from which we cannot flee.

A *bacano* psychoanalysis must be like a Möbius strip; just as the outside and the inside dilute as we transit within it, so too does what is and is not psychoanalysis. There is no *pure* psychoanalysis, only a praxis that, through its act, traces its existence from a non-orientable surface; the orientation is given by every act where the subject of the unconscious speaks and listens.

Psychoanalysis is an experience of listening to the saying of a subject and their location in a world with others. In this subjective place, the subject can suffer, but they can also know how to make a life beyond that suffering; this latter is the commitment of psychoanalysis as praxis. The psychoanalytic experience cannot become a kind of tragic cynicism where the only thing left is to recognize impossibility from a place of impotence. Psychoanalysis is a power of the impossible; it is believing and creating a life from the singularity of each subject; thinking the impossible of the real of life is assuming that a know-how can be elaborated with it.

Fantasy can make our reality the most terrible thing, just as it could also be the most sublime thing; the issue is how to sustain an act that is capable of recreating that reality to make life something sublime. What is a fantasy? It is

recreating the world that we were given; it is coloring it according to our desires; it is making the path of life a possible way to live. Fantasizing is what makes us human, because it is an act that creates a presence out of an absence.

The term Freud used was *phantasie* (fantasy), which did not sound good in French, so they translated it as *phantasm*, although in the Lacanian world there is still insistence on phantom and not *phantasie* (Fantasy). It is better to continue talking about both concepts and not just one. In Spanish, as in English, *fantasy* has a subjective and cultural creative power, as noted by the excellent work of Anthony Sampson (1992) "fantasy is not a phantasm" which tells us: "there is an unavoidable ambiguity in Freud's use of the word *phantasie* (fantasy), a constant oscillation that is what allows Freud all his analyses of the creative processes of artists, the formations of screen memories, hysterical attacks, obsessive compulsions, and also his speculations about the origins of human culture, etc."

We fantasize because we cannot achieve the whole, so with our fantasies, we can make that impossibility an act: desiring. And what allows that to happen is love, what makes desire possible is love, that which borders the void so that the not-all is a destiny and not an all that leads to nothingness. Desire is the path that love traces when it borders the void. For Zupančič (2012), "Love is structured as a comedy." As such, love can be defined as an enduring non-relationship. Comedy is the genre that uses the complementary non-relationship as a condition of a relationship" (p. 201). To the question of whether we are willing to love, we must ask another question: are we willing

to lose something of ourselves, and are we willing to trust that this other will not take advantage of that loss?

The psychoanalytic experience is being able to sustain desire, the pause that allows the emergence of the subject, the one who does not allow themselves to be trapped, controlled, or predicted. The pause that makes it possible to endure the subject's uncertainty through love. Love is what allows the intertwining of desires between subjects who want to create life. We spend our lives searching for the object of desire, without understanding that life itself is the desire; there is no object, only a path on which, if we are careless, it becomes blurred along with those objects that can turn into a *jouissance* leading us to a death within life itself.

Van Gogh's quote: "There is nothing more artistic than loving" suggests that love is a creative act, and like every act of that type, it implies transformation, pain, and work. Thus, making love is the art that makes it possible for pain to constitute a bond with the other through work with oneself and with others.

A *bacano* psychoanalysis is capable of creating spaces rather than imposing them; in this act of creation, there is a place for the subject, a place for their saying through another who listens, because the important thing in this act is the event that arises between what is said and what is heard, and what emerges from that is the subject of the unconscious.

The closer we are to funny psychoanalysis, the closer we will be to true psychoanalysis. In time, it will wear out; it will be done through approximations and tricks. Nothing of what is done will be understood anymore, just as it is no longer necessary to understand anything about optics to make a microscope. Let us rejoice then, we are still doing psychoanalysis (Lacan, 1995, p.125).

To traverse an analysis is to be able to retroactively recreate the past to historicize it in other ways. This is where psychoanalysis cannot become something ossified, much less something adaptive, without subversive effects, in a fast and boring clinic for a few. For Lacan: "to be a psychoanalyst is, simply, to open one's eyes to the evidence that nothing is more absurd than human reality" (Lacan, 1981, p.120).

The reality principle was an insult to the English psychoanalyst Winnicott, which is why, through an apperceptive act, one must create other worlds, invent other signifiers that allow a subject to find their place in a world.

For me, living creatively means not being dead or annihilated all the time by submission or reaction to what comes to us from the world: it means seeing all things in a new way all the time. I refer to apperception, which is the opposite of perception (Winnicott, 1971, p. 50-51).

In an era where the ego and its self-love are reinforced, it is no coincidence that the so-called mental disorders have become generalized. Both lead to a domination of the ego and the other, and it is there that the true suffering lies: in having the domination of the

indomitable as an object. What to do with that something that always exceeds us, that always remains, that is the challenge we have in life: letting it crush us in a deathly *jouissance* or creating a path to desire and live with that something.

Listening is not hearing; in the latter, there is a direct relationship with obedience, while in the former there is a possibility of doing something different from being trapped in it. It is creating, making the voice of the other something more than a command, a saying that can be silenced to give way to one's own saying with what the other has said; it is believing that one can say something beyond what the other has already said; it is making oneself from a saying. Words transform, but only when they are welcomed from a listening that enables this act.

Our symptoms cause us to fall; a symptom, in its etymology, means fall, failure, but the symptom is also a revolutionary force that allows a creative act in each subject, leading them to renew the social bond with another. The symptom makes us limp, but as Freud reminds us in his text "*Beyond the Pleasure Principle*": "What cannot be seized in flight must be attained limping. The scripture says: 'limping is no sin.'"

One should do as Vincent Van Gogh tells us: "I dream of painting and then I paint my dreams," to dream of living and then live dreaming, to create the canvas of a life impregnated with colors. Dreaming is a debt to desire, both for oneself and for others; as long as we do not settle those debts, dreaming can turn into an unbearable nightmare.

Therefore, dreaming is a confrontation with our desire that invites us to make an act of it. That is why Socrates said: "An unexamined life is not worth living," and that self-examination does not cease to be a painful but healing act for the subject; there is no subjective transformation without pain, nor subjective transformation that does not involve the other, so the examination of self refers to a care of self and of others. What to do with that *jouissance* of the Other that appears to us in the form of a nightmare? Those that break any veil that sets a limit to the traumatic real—weave the veil again; words in their saying do it, listening allows that weaving so that nightmares can turn into dreaming again. What is dreaming for? To make us realize that our desires cannot be postponed indefinitely in a life yet to be lived.

Living is an event, not because it has extraordinary things, but because it is the act where a know-how transforms simple and ordinary things into a life event. Believing and creating are two things of every day that allow one to glimpse a sunlight; believing and creating is what could make a life, linking it with others through the fabrics of living. In the Japanese technique of Kintsukuroi, objects are repaired by joining the broken parts with golden lacquer (gold, originally); here the fracture is beautified, showing the scars as something to be appreciated and not hidden, turning those objects into art. Life is like this, a series of fractures and scars where one must make art out of them—the art of living.

Listening sweetly is going at the rhythm of the other's words, with their pauses, so that those words become a tune where a subject can locate themselves from their own history;

that is the musical side of the psychoanalytic device, that each subject finds their own rhythm and dances with it and with others. A word may mean nothing, which is why it needs one and another to form phrases that link together to be able to say something that never finishes being said entirely, which is why listening to those words is an unending task; listening to our stories involves another, which is why it is listening-to-ourselves. That is the relevance of psychoanalysis in contemporaneity, as Agamben points out, reclaiming Foucault's ontology of the present or Benjamin's legibility—it is from our capacity to listen to our stories that we are contemporary.

Michel Foucault, when he wrote that his historical inquiries into the past are only the shadow brought from his theoretical interrogation of the present. And Walter Benjamin, when he wrote that the historical index contained in the images of the past shows that they will reach legibility only at a certain moment in their history. It is from our capacity to listen to that demand and that shadow, to be contemporary not only of our century and of the now (Agamben, 2018).

Without history, there is no present, much less a future, and the way to account for that history is to tell-ourselves that history through the listening of another, to tell-ourselves with joy. If a psychoanalysis does not lead to joy: What is a psychoanalysis for? Joy would be the act of recognizing the limit traced by the "impossible," contrary to the current neoliberal happiness, which is the denial of that limit of the impossible: "joy, or to speak my language, the *gay saber*, is a reward for a continuous, daring, tenacious,

subterranean effort, which, to tell the truth, is not for everyone" (Lacan, 1976-1977).

Contrary to what is believed, the *gay saber* (joyful knowledge) is a way of responding differently to the superego imperatives of neoliberal capitalism's happiness; to the latter, one can only react from a depressive impotence. Joy, like love, is in the feminine, it is a not-all; one can only be joyful because of the negativity of the whole, so joy is only possible before the limit of the impossibility of total *jouissance*.

The psychoanalytic experience cannot be a directed listening to make the subject's saying coincide with a fixed structure. This psychoanalytic experience is rather a listening to the rhythm of the different places of the subject that manifest in various ways, from delusions or hallucinations to slips of everyday life. A *bacano* psychoanalytic experience or a praxis far from psychiatric biomedicine or what they call "the clinic"⁵. Going through a psychoanalysis is returning to oneself session after session in a different way.

⁵ The use of the phrase psychoanalytic experience or analytical experience (more Lacanian) is due to the fact that the use of the word clinical is still more associated with medical practice. What is proposed in this book is that the psychoanalytic experience distances itself from that prevailing biomedical practice today. Although the clinical signifier is still used, that of analytical experience or psychoanalytic experience will also be employed.

The problem is that "psychoanalytic clinic"⁶ as a practice is increasingly taken over by the biomedical ideology of protocols: guidelines and standards, and less by listening to the subject. Guided by a medical ideology, in the psychoanalytic experience, the "clinic" is increasingly oriented by the search for structures that account for an essence of the subject, and in the symptoms—signs. Thus, a clinical expertise closer to hypnotic suggestion than to analytical transference is configured.

The psychoanalytic experience cannot be taken over by a medical practice, despite the fact that Freud and Lacan themselves tried to remove it from that place. It is known that medical logics allow security and guarantee in the face of a praxis of uncertainty, of an event that allows the listening and saying of a subject. Psychoanalytic praxis does not seek clinical certainties in diagnoses based on what has been called clinical structures. The first thing to say about the phrase clinical structures is that it is absent in both the work of Freud and Lacan. This phrase was an attempt by Lacan's disciple, Jacques Alain Miller, in the late seventies and early eighties of the 20th century to obtain certainty and demonstrative conviction in clinical structures (Sierra, 2019, p.209). Freud and Lacan, being doctors, tried to move away from medicine to constitute the psychoanalytic experience; Miller, being a philosopher, in a reactionary act, converted that experience into a medicalizing clinical act to investigate clinical structures.

⁶ A phrase that Lacan used very few times in his teaching and whose disuse was due to the fact that every time 'clinic' is used, one must account for the predominance of medicine in the term.

The phrase became popular in Lacanian psychoanalytic praxis due to that certainty and demonstrative conviction, which gave security to a praxis of listening to a subject with uncertainty. Thus, the phrase *clinical structures* became the certainty needed so that psychoanalysts could diagnose from their own psychopathology. In most Latin American countries, the use of this phrase spread rapidly, due to the psychoanalytic clinical demand; this phrase became the necessary foundation for that clinical exercise. Furthermore, the idea of a "pure" psychoanalytic psychoanalysis from the clinic via medicine was always present in psychoanalytic institutions. It must not be forgotten that IPA institutions in Latin America, until the last decades of the 20th century, only accepted doctors as psychoanalytic candidates; later, the psychological profession was introduced, but following the same medical logics. The entry of Lacanism, in the early eighties, did not change these logics; on the contrary, it continued to reinforce them on many occasions. Despite more than forty years of expansion of a clinic founded on clinical structures, and the hundreds to thousands of texts that can be found to develop and justify an idea of a structure's clinic, it is still striking that this clinic continues to adopt a medical diagnosis model where some add the adjective *transferential*; regarding this, Braunstein comments:

Despite its denials, the [Theory of Clinical Structures] does not cease to be a post-Lacanian proposal for a rigid classification of subjects who can access the diagnostic gaze of a supposed subject of knowledge, of a supposed psychoanalyst. There would be three structures and only three, neurosis, psychosis, perversion, which have been fixed by the theorists of one of the associations born after

the dissolution of the Freudian School of Paris (EFP) (Braunstein, 2017).

What if instead of seeking fixed, immutable, and definitive clinical structures in the saying of a subject, we dedicate ourselves to listening to their desiring position in relation to others and the Other?

How to maintain a theory of fixed, immutable, and definitive clinical structures underlying Lacan's discourse until the end of his teaching, and propose it (after his death) as founded on his words when we can still hear his discourse: Joyce was crazy: Why, after all, shouldn't Joyce have been crazy? All the more so since this does not constitute a privilege, if it is true that in the majority the symbolic, the imaginary, and the real are entangled to such an extent that they continue one into the other, in the absence of an operation that distinguishes them as in the chain of the Borromean knot—of the so-called Borromean knot, I would say, because the Borromean knot is not a knot, it is a chain (Braunstein, 2017).

We must strive for an erotic of psychoanalytic practice in an era where eroticism appears less and less and the pornographic appears more. We must bet on an erotics of listening to the subject and their desiring place. Eroticism is about listening to the saying of a subject, to the words spoken, but above all, to what is not said. Psychoanalysis cannot act by responding to normalize desire in fixed places that are pathologized by the maintenance of clinical structures. Could it be that the erotics of psychoanalytic practice, as Braunstein tells us, is to draw a cartography of

desiring subjectivity, where we can locate the desiring position in each subject:

(The) concrete desiring position invoked here is variable and depends, not on a stagnant structure but on the subject's relationship with others and with the Other of their history that is actualized at every moment of their vital conjuncture or the development of their discourse in the psychoanalysis session. This is what the clinic under transference teaches us; it is the switch that marks our path in the response we bring to a subject who suffers from the signifier and would be ready to yield on their desire. We have much to gain from the idea of a cartography of desiring subjectivity, an ethical reference for psychopathology (in reality, a change of terrain for psychoanalysis: the passage from medicine to ethics), which constitutes a subversion against the contemporary failure in the apprehension of the clinical real (Braunstein, 2017).

“The notion of structure means nothing more than the Borromean knot” (Lacan, 1976-1977). The consistency of the Borromean knot and the real-symbolic-imaginary knotting signifies the consistency of the subject's structure.

The clinic in general (beyond psychoanalytic praxis) has been taken over by a psychological practice converted into a matter of standardized guides and protocols. The psychoanalytic experience must be rescued from such a monstrosity, as it is a method that accompanies another or several others, which is why psychoanalytic experience can exist in the legal field, as well as in sociology and other disciplines. Thus, the psychoanalytic act is not exclusive to a

discipline like psychology or medicine; it is time not to yield in words so as not to yield in deeds, as Freud said.

There is an “old” clinic in psychoanalysis where biomedical logics disguised as “structural” psychoanalytic concepts still prevail, just as there is another clinic (calling it new is snobbery). In this other clinic, a case only serves for that case; there is no clinical orientation guided by a structure “within” a subject (neurosis, psychosis, perversion), much less a clinic of neurosis or psychosis for everyone. The other clinic is *not all*; that is what the psychoanalytic experience should aim for.

Is everything there? If I have spoken of clinical types, it has not been without reason. I would like to make an observation, and that is that subjects of a hysteric or obsessive type—according to the old clinic—have no usefulness whatsoever for others of the same type. It is more than conceivable—it is touched with the finger every day—that one obsessive cannot make the slightest sense of the discourse of another obsessive (Lacan, 1973).

The clinic of knots or nodal clinic re-evaluates what for some is a structural clinic. The nodal clinic is what returns us to the point: each subject must be listened to in their singularity; there are no structures that group subjects into a neurosis, psychosis, or perversion:

The psychoanalytic experience is nodal, where symptoms are knots that intertwine according to each subject and their singularity. The question begins with the fact that there are types of symptoms—that is, of knots—that there is a clinic, a clinic that is prior to the analytical discourse;

(...) Does analysis, discourse, the idea of the symptom as a knot, shed any light on that prior clinic? (Lacan, 1975).

The answer to that Lacanian question is answered by Lacan himself in Seminar 21: "The Names of the Father" or "The Unsuspecting Err" (1973-74) where he tells us: "My dear structure, My trashy structure! It proves to be Borromean knot! The psychoanalytic experience, that other clinic, is not a matter of 'clinical structures' (it has already been said that Lacan never proposed such a thing but Miller in his eagerness to create a 'demonstrative' clinic to distance himself from his theoretical-philosophical past, dividing 'theoretical' psychoanalysts from 'clinical' psychoanalysts); it is something nodal, and the question is how to listen to those knotting of the subject in relation to the *jouissance* and desire that configures them: "Desire has no other substance than that which is secured by the knots themselves" (Lacan, 2010, p. 152).

Psychoanalytic praxis aims to subvert the suffering subjectivity of a subject and the reality that conforms to that suffering. If psychoanalysis does not subvert the suffering subjectivity of a subject and the reality that surrounds them, it would be just another practice among the many that the neoliberal market offers to adapt the individual to the ideals of contemporaneity, and which have more to do with having than with losing or letting go.

To let go is to lose by creating, making the absence the possibility of another presence. Freud said that words are magical, balms for the soul, but they are so only when they find someone to listen to them. The psychoanalytic

experience is a praxis of negativity where the creative power of living arises. Words can become a creative act when, between word and word, they enable other words from a void; poetry and beauty emerge there.

Precipitating to accept the folding seat offered by the establishment, especially medical, but also university, psychoanalysts undoubtedly gain some immediate advantages, but they lose their proper vocation. They follow the slope of a discreet return to the medical and university order. It is the very principle of the superego function of an "order" to which one should conform and adapt that psychoanalysis questions, both in its relationship with public authorities and in individual cures. Psychoanalytic theory is not a doctrinal body that should be taught, but rather the set of references that allow the analyst to listen to their patient, (...) Parallely, it is also the notion of mental illness that is subverted. The doctor can have no other formula to propose in this regard than to make a diagnosis by elimination (Clavreul, 1983, p.177).

Listening is not staying silent; it is allowing silence to go at the rhythm of each word so that a saying about the subject can be elaborated, the one who bravely comes to the act of telling-themselves with another: "You learn to read what love writes in silence. Subtle love knows how to listen with the eyes. If it is not true, then no one ever loved, and I wrote nothing," Bataille tells us.

Psychoanalysis does not defend the abstract freedom that neoliberal capitalism promises as an ideal; on the contrary, it enables a subject to locate themselves in a place that allows them to say: It is right to rebel! In the era where

almost everything can be bought, eroticism appears linked to desire, which is constituted around a non-existent object, and every time one tries to capture that object, *jouissance* appears. The objects of desire that capitalist hyper-production tries to sell us are nothing more than objects of *jouissance*. Thus, psychoanalysis continues to insist on desire, eroticism, and love as acts that insist on the subject's place. Eroticism arises when desire signals the path of each subject, warning that there is no object, but rather a discontinuity that turns that path into an abyss; desire is what can give a frame to that abyss, while eroticism borders that frame. Thus, in every subject dwells a discontinuity impossible to be settled by the subject or others. Not for nothing did one of the authors who best conceived of eroticism maintain that:

Every being is distinct from all others. Their birth, their death, and the events of their life may be of some interest to others, but only they are interested in all that. Only they are born. Only they die. Between one being and another there is an abyss, there is a discontinuity (Bataille, 1997, p. 16-17).

The psychoanalytic work is a loving event, an erotic link that, from a saying, enables the subject's listening, subverting their place to transform their reality; this loving event is an erotic-political act. Psychoanalysis is an erotology, and the French psychoanalyst Lacan knew that, since it deals with desire. Psychoanalysis is an erotics because it takes charge of an object that is not there, that never was, and never will be. Not yielding on desire has to do with making a tragic mourning for the non-existence of the object of desire, which will give way to object *a*. This

erotization of the *dis-encounter* with the object can bring suffering, but also a possibility of doing something with that remainder that signals a void.

There is eroticism wherever love allows *jouissance* to condescend to desire. Love has a function of a veil, inasmuch as it wraps, it clothes the body as an object. There, erotics is the creation of the beautiful/sublime, which is the consequence of giving form and place to desire. Psychoanalysis as erotics is the place of a sublime listening. Erotics, in the psychoanalytic experience, is bordering the void that is interwoven with words, positioning the subject in another way. There, the traversal of the fantasy is recognizing that there is always a void, and when this is bordered, it creates a hole, which enables the elaboration of a know-how, this being a creative act where the subject can locate themselves. The encounter with the real's void makes a place possible for the subject, so the analyst is a support, a prop, as Winnicott said of the transitional object, the separating object *a*. The analyst's desire must seek that absolute difference between object *a* and the Ideal (Lacan, 2003). This erotic allows for giving form to the irremediable loss of the object, creating a hole that borders the void. Psychoanalysis proposes an erotics that brings sexuality into play, that which Freud pointed out to us as traumatic. Why? One cannot know everything about sexuality; there is always something that escapes it.

Being explicit doesn't resolve the mystical aspect either, in fact, it usually kills it because people don't want to see sex so much as experience the emotions you get with the sex act. And those are hard to transmit in a movie because sex is a complete mystery. David Lynch

That mystery is nothing different from the void; what Lynch calls mystery is ordered by sex, veiling the truth of the real; behind that veil there is a void. Recognizing it and doing something sublime with it is what has been called erotics, and that is the commitment of psychoanalysis since Freud.

Eros is an archaic, pre-human, totally bestial plate, which approaches the emergent continent of language in two forms: anxiety and laughter. Anxiety and laughter are the scattered ashes that slowly fall from that volcano. Societies and language do not cease to protect themselves from that overflow that threatens them. For that, we invent fathers, that is, stories in order to give meaning to the chance of a burst that none of us can see (Quignard, 2000, p.10).

Art erotizes the hole of the void through a creative act; to that extent, psychoanalysis would make it listening an art where a subject, through their saying, borders that void with the hole of their being, erotizing their existence. Psychoanalysis is an erotic practice, that goes from anxiety to laughter and from tragedy to comedy.

Comedy is a very curious desire-trap. Every time a desire-trap works, we are in comedy. It is desire insofar as it appears where it was not expected. The ridiculous father, the hypocritical devotee, the virtuous person who is prey to an adulterous enterprise: this is what comedy is made of. That element that makes desire not confess itself is necessary. It is masked and unmasked, it is mocked, sometimes it is punished, but that is only formal, since in true comedies, punishment does not even brush the crow's

wing of desire, which escapes intact (Lacan, 2014, p.460).

Listening to the subject's tragedy and transforming it into comedy, just as Freud made something else of the hysterics' tragedy.

Freud made the tragic suffering of the 19th-century hysterics a place of listening; he gave them a place, beyond the suffering women who paid with their bodies for not finding a place in rigid Victorian society. Freud was able to make his practice, which came from medicine, a place for the erotics of the female body, and that was what his mentor Breuer could not tolerate, who fled in fright at the first hint of that erotic. The psychoanalytic experience is not a couch, nor does a couch make that experience. The psychoanalytic experience, if that can be associated with psychoanalytic praxis, would be a signifier where someone positions themselves to bet on a subject so that they can elaborate their saying. What can never happen in that praxis is for a signifier to become a sign (Le Gaufey, 2004).

Although it is true that if psychoanalysis in its experience has given a place to anybody erotics, it is the feminine one. It is the first therapeutic that gives voice to the singularity of the woman, a voice that had been relegated and confined in the pain of the body that was not listened to. In that sense, it is not unreasonable to say that psychoanalysis is a device, first, that opens a place to listen to the singular and the unspeakable of the feminine. Freud invents psychoanalysis through the listening to bodies that speak from their symptoms through the repressed sexuality

of hysterics. Later, psychoanalysis reinvents itself by listening to the erotic madness of psychotics; psychoanalysis invents and reinvents itself from listening to the erotics of the body.

The frame, the window, make what they frame a sacred place; the erotic is linked to the sacred by means of a limiting frame. Today, the erotic is increasingly difficult because frames are dismantled, borders are increasingly diffuse, objects enter and exit without any limit, and there, as Bataille (1997) points out, one cannot make of the activity "an exuberance of life" (p. 15), much less approach death itself. Without approximation to death, there can be no life; the symbolic of death is what allows the real of life to be sustained, and bodies are left at the mercy of an imaginary that cannot be linked either to the symbolic of death or to the real of life. Consumable bodies, bodies that are placed as objects of a deadly *jouissance*, an obscene *jouissance*, where there are only bodies showing themselves, exhibiting themselves: pornographic *jouissance*.

All eroticism is sacred, Bataille told us; frames must be created. Eroticism requires time, silence, spaces, pauses; it is a veil to be woven and unraveled. Like Penelope, with that burial cloth, she weaves and unravels while waiting for Odysseus; that act of weaving and unraveling is what allows the other to be welcomed, to be given a place; it is the possibility of erotizing them. Psychoanalytic work is about that: unraveling to weave, it also creates frames that sustain the real of life. It is a field that oscillates between life and death, the tragic and the comic, the sweet and the violent. Not for nothing is Eros a demigod, a *Daimon*, son of *Poros*,

resource, and *Penia*, poverty, hence he is always between the limit of indigence and satiety. Eros is what is located between the mortal and the immortal; it is an intermediary power between life and death, capable of placing our bodies between them, like the orgasmic moment. If psychoanalysis is an erotic practice, then it is a place where the subject can elaborate a know-how about life and death, can place their body there, from a potency, from a possibility, from the path of desire that opens up to death and life.

Life can be an unbearable tragedy; the psychoanalytic commitment is to be able to make that unbearable thing a comedy capable of being lived. The void of the real can only be accounted for *a posteriori*, from the imaginary and symbolic that give form and consistency to the hole, the same with the subject, only from their subjective manifestations, their symptoms, jokes, slips, dreams—that is why the psychoanalytic device is a way of linking the real, symbolic, and imaginary.

Psychoanalysis does not cure like medicine; it is a cure, but one of the care of self and of others, it is an *epimeleia heautou*, a *cura sui*, it is a cure of the spiritual practice where the other is accompanied in that care of self and of others. Traversing a psychoanalysis is not making the unconscious conscious, it is not knowing many things, it is not even knowing more, it is knowing how to do with what is not known; it is always a path to be traveled, never to be reached, it is a praxis of doing with the impossibility of knowing.

What is a psychoanalytic praxis yet to be done/to be? It is a praxis that is never finished, never fixed, a praxis of uncertainty, where there are no pre-fixed categories, where in every encounter with what is said and what is heard, an event occurs, making the subject of the unconscious emerge, the one who does not know that they know and who believes that there is an Other who knows what they do not know. This event will make it possible for them to recognize-self at some point that they know what they do not know; at that moment, they will be able to locate themselves differently in the face of the fatality of destiny and recreate it in a life yet to be lived. Love is a supplement that allows for making a bond with the other from the impossibility of making one with that other.

The act of listening to another is sustaining a space where that other can say something that they do not even dare to say to themselves. The act of listening is the possibility for a subject, for their saying, for living. Listening to words is also listening to the silences between them, but above all, it is listening to the whispers of the soul between words and silences. A word that resonates, a word that vibrates in a different way, listening is the act that allows one to feel the agitation that occurs in the silence between words that indicate that one signifier accounts for the subject before another signifier.

The difference between void and nothingness is that, in the latter, something is introduced into that void that can be ominous, terrible, a phantasm or spectrum that causes us anxiety. We are not in the era of the void but of spectral nothingness, a phantasm that condemns us to suffer its

totalizing presence, against which we are left with distractions; reality shows are proof of this, as are social media, or ceasing to feel, which translates into drugs like opioids and their derivatives, or suicide, not as an exit to death but to suffering life.

Hopelessness signals an end: "Hope is over," but one must always remember that it is an open ending, as psychoanalysis points out, so that end can be unraveled to be woven again. The analytic space is where a subject can make those fabrics that they unravel and weave into a network with others, a social bond to be able to make life something that can be accompanied with others, a network of fabrics that sustain not only a life but a life with others.


Desire, that path so difficult to travel and so easy to evade, which is why traversing it is a matter not only of courage but of persistence and insistence; it is a path that is never finished being traveled, where its end would be death. On that path, life must be made an aesthetics of existence. The knot refers to "the three dimensions of the space inhabited by the speaker," and that is what the other clinic in psychoanalysis should be interested in.

"To live is to resist," Jorge Semprún tells us, to which we can also say that it is to re-exist; it is being able to make of each story a rewriting of life, it is being able to make a fanciful recreation with our crushing phantasms where life can be lived, and that is what the psychoanalytic experience is about, the possibility for a subject to be able to make their re-existence an art of living. We are thrown into the world, as Heidegger told us, we are helpless as Freud told us. The

issue is how to turn that throwing, that helplessness into a shelter, into an inhabiting of the world. That is the task of psychoanalysis: to sustain a space so that a subject can create the possibility of inhabiting-being.

The difference between a home and a house is that in the former there is a place for the subject to take shelter, which is why dreams and desires can emerge there. For Kant, the function of the dream is to discover what we would have been; for psychoanalysis, in this preterite, paths open up to becoming possibilities of being.

The void is what makes us differentiate between the whole and nothingness. In both the one and the other, we are crushed as subjects, since it is impossible to try to fill the void, because what it signals is that we are always left with nothing. The issue is always to border that void. In psychoanalytic praxis, this is what is listened to: how a subject positions themselves in a spiral time, as Cheng (2022) shows us in his book *Empty and Full*. To be able to sustain a void where a subject can listen-to-be, where they can locate themselves as the consequence of a history, where a past can be linked to a present for a future.



The psychoanalytic act is a poetry of absence, and with it, it makes presence; it is the possibility of creating by means of an irreducible void. Love is a signifier that allows a sign of desire to be made and a path to be traced for a subject to traverse life.

There are noises that dislocate us; the psychoanalytic act of listening is faced with the challenge of tuning those noises to be able to dance with them to the rhythm of a melody. Psychoanalytic praxis turns the real of life into a dance with another through the production of music that comes from the Other. The paradox of being in psychoanalysis is that I can only be in my saying, but in every saying I can never be; thus, my being is an impossibility of saying-being, it is a permanent slip, and it is only in that impossibility that I can be.

The Other must be barred. The ominous is that which is shown without a veil, without limits—"I am the law"—which becomes perverse. Faced with the inability to recognize difference, it institutes it by force, imposing lack on the other to sustain a complete Other. Here, signifiers are elevated, which are fixed as signifieds of order, of completeness; thus, praxis becomes something complete, without flaws or fissures. The issue is that the constitution of culture requires some flaw, some fissure, some incompleteness; without that, cultural creation is not possible, much less the desire that sustains the subject and their subjectivity. Thus, praxis itself can emerge as a symptom, as that which signals the flaw that a "pure" praxis tries to plug.

A *bacano* psychoanalysis enables listening; it is a commitment that not only denounces a praxis but is also a symptom that must be heard to prevent repetition from being an increasingly overwhelming and devastating return, both for psychoanalytic praxis itself and for social bonds. If a psychoanalytic praxis desires to approach the community, it would have to be not only holed but also topologically constituted at the subject's entrance and exit, a place where listening allows those exits and entrances. Totally closed and totally open spaces refer to a nothingness, and what is intended here is for them to be spaces that allow for bordering and weaving it.

1.2. Subversion, subject, and psychoanalysis: beyond happiness

Kepler was the one who finished eliminating geocentric residues. If Copernicus inaugurated the decentering of the world, Kepler concluded that movement, which gave way to the decentering of the universe, which is no longer a fearful and terrible whole, but a universe that we can access to know something, a holed universe. What psychoanalysis comes to signal is that we are not the center of ourselves, for there is something in us that is the subject of the unconscious, and that is the subversion of the subject for psychoanalysis.

Just as the universe is holed, it is not-all, the subject that Freud discovers and Lacan later theorizes is a void, which we can only account for by holing it. The subject is the saying of an absence, of a void, and this last is what drags the subject to name themselves through signifiers and

give themselves existence, but it is between those signifiers that that subject can be glimpsed. The form is what drags the content, contrary to the slogan of a famous soft drink advertisement, the image is not-nothing, which does not mean that the image is all, but that the image is not-all.

Thanks to the image being not-all, erotics can exist, which has been so lost today, besides desire and love. It is from that which cannot be totalized that an erotic of desire arises; one could say that the subject is erotics because they can never be trapped, totalized, or entirely spoken; they slip between signifiers. It is as if the subject and their desire were always yet to be done. Might this not be what making love truly means? We cannot take all of the other, so we need to link ourselves to them through love, a love that cannot be entirely said, but in that impossibility, love is made with the other as a subject. This loving making can be done in a thousand and one ways; there is no guide or protocol, however much sexologists may want to make it a catalog to avoid the anxiety that the subject as neighbor brings us.

Love intertwines with the void, having its sustenance in desire; it is there where the pain and melancholy that arise from absence can make a life be lived by a subject. Psychoanalysis here would be a know-how about the real of life, an art of living that creates upon the subject's void.

But in this era, it is difficult to bet on that subversion of the subject, on an erotics of desire and love in the subject. Psychological practices have produced an ego—individual with self-esteem, and capable of being entrepreneurial and happy. *Psi* practices can also be constituted that subvert

these dominant tendencies, lines of flight or re-existence. The subject proposed by psychoanalysis is a subject that does not allow itself to be trapped; what is apprehensible is the ego through its identifications, trapped in the superego mandates that force it to strengthen its identifications to the ideals of neoliberal capitalism. The subject is that which cannot be colonized.

A psychoanalytic praxis that makes it possible to think and live in ways different from those of an entrepreneurial ego, a praxis that subverts that imposing order of neoliberal capitalism of everyone happy and producing to consume. A political subversion of the subject is an erotic-political place where desire is what traces a path that is not calculable, quantifiable, or profitable; that is, something is always to-come, to arrive, contrary to that fixed egoic individual tethered to their identifications.

1.3. The individual impotence of love

The other problem that arises in this psychological individualization is that of love. The individual is the persistence of the illusion of the one, of that mythical love of the fusion of two into one that the French philosopher Badiou (2021) has criticized in recent years, but the individual is the fusion into unity without love. To bet then on the division of the subject that psychoanalysis proposes would be to bet on love; the split subject is a commitment to love, of a two that never turns into one, of two subjects who can never be individuals, nor can they become unity. The attacks in which love is currently involved, even branding it as illusory, forget that the illusory thing is not love but the

illusion of the one, the illusion of the individual's oneness; love would be what bets on the two.

There is something universal about love, and that is why all these stories are of interest to a mass audience: every love proposes a new experience of truth about what it means to be two and not one. Every love provides proof that the world can be found and experienced outside of a solitary consciousness (Badiou, 2021, p. 44).

The reverse of that autonomous individual of self-esteem is depression, or the solitary responses of *jouissance* from hyper-productivity and consumption. Love breaks the illusion of the individual. In neoliberal capitalism, that possibility becomes increasingly difficult, since psychological practices have turned the imperative of “self-love” into a slogan, which, like every superego mandate, is an impossible ideal to satisfy, and this impotence of mandates to fulfill returns as depressive symptoms. In that mandate to love oneself, there is an elimination of the other, a loving oneself without the discomfort or the unbearable nature of the other.

Thus, it is curious that, in the poetic fragment by Rimbaud (1993): “Love must be reinvented” (p. 59), a new order of love is proposed; while, from a philosophical perspective, according to Dolar (2017): “the mission of modern philosophy would then be nothing less than the invention of the two” (p.13). Following that logic, for psychoanalysis, this would be: “the subject must be reinvented”, that which will never be able to say *I* in a complete, but rather divided, manner.

The egoic individualism is impotent in the face of love, of the recognition of the difference of the other as neighbor. Taking that ego, even for psychoanalysis itself, was a nefarious path, as Lacan states:

The terms for which we raise the problem of psychoanalytic intervention here make it quite clear, it seems to us, that ethics is not individualistic (...) But its practice in the North American sphere has been so summarily reduced to a means of obtaining 'success' and a mode of demanding 'happiness,' that it should be specified that this is the abnegation of psychoanalysis (Lacan 1997, p. 399).

Psychological practices knew how to take advantage of that ego, from self-esteem to happiness, dedicating themselves to that orthopedics of the ego. That is why psychoanalysis is needed now more than ever, because it never surrendered to the brilliance of the successful ego, both for those who wanted to be listened to and for those who listened. Hence, the entire Lacanian psychoanalytic commitment was always for the subject, dislocating the unifying egoic pretension, or where the ego invents an identity or a coherence (Foucault, 1992, p. 10). The advent of the subject aims to dissolve the stories that progressively advance toward their success. In contrast, the subject is precisely the opposite; the rise of the ego in all its forms in psychological practices is that of *Winner Psychology* and, for that, it managed to colonize and definitively plant the flag of colonization on that individual. Unfortunately for those interests, something always escapes them, and that is the subject. As long as there is a subject, there is possibility, faced with the fatal destiny imposed by the egoic

identifications of neoliberal capitalism's ideals, a place that has been shown from a totality, but an alternative can also emerge: subversion, something other, the subject.

The subject is openness, it is a void that cannot be filled, no matter how much egoic identity tries to do so, and that means it is the reverse of the individual. While many *psi* practices fly the flag of the individual, and turn their place into their ideal, for a psychoanalytic practice, the subject becomes the reverse, the back door that can offer an exit to possibilities different from those of the ideals of neoliberal capitalism.

2.

A Bacano, motley, and subaltern psychoanalysis

I do not consider myself Lacanian, Marxist, or even Foucauldian, despite using them in my writings, as I do other European and North American authors. I have a little of each of them, but despite that, I am not them. Fortunately, I am something more than the sum of all of them: what am I? I feel better as a subaltern in the saying of Spivak (2003), who takes up Gramsci. She, an Indian woman, is closer to the indigenous part of what I am, words that refer to the signifier of the other, of the non-European that I am, that is: of the Indians.

A subaltern cannot be heard, which is why ways must be sought to do so. Fortunately, I am also Caribbean, like another Fanon, not from the French Caribbean but the Spanish one, but a Caribbean nonetheless—one of those indigenous people who never allowed themselves to be conquered by the Spanish and other European colonizers. Hence, they had to invent a cannibalistic European fantasy, animalizing the native they could not appropriate, which is how they were named: *Caribes* (Caribs).

While I am not black-skinned, white-mask like Fanon's book, I am a *mestizo* for whom it is very difficult not to wear a white mask. Although, instead of *mestizo*, I should call myself *ch'ixi* as Rivera Cusicanqui (2018) points out, that is, *ch'ixi* skin, white mask. The *ch'ixi* does not allow itself to be trapped in that dominant white ideology which, at times, is seen as the only horizon for being an academic or

intellectual in a world dominated by Western white logics. But getting to that *ch'ixi* is work; it is questioning that internal colonialism that González Casanova (2006) proposed, where we replace the white, Spanish colonizer with the place of the Creole *mestizo*, and thus continue the dominant colonizing logic for other groups and collectives.

Perhaps it will be said that Latin American intellectuals do not conduct themselves like the old European slave masters. Are we not still a colony, not only economically but intellectually, of Europe and the United States in Latin America? To give just one example that concerns me, how many Lacanian psychoanalysts are taken into account in the psychoanalytic schools and institutions beyond being students and disciples; and how many Europeans are turned into masters and heads of schools in the various psychoanalytic groups in Latin America. But this is not the only problem; Latin American psychoanalysts cannot even consider the possibility of being "great psychoanalysts" unless they are analyzed in Paris or attend a course there, waiting for some authorization from the master-lord, contradicting, even, the teaching of Master Lacan: "The analyst is authorized only by himself" (Lacan, 2012, p.327), some say, "and with the others," but those others do not necessarily have to live in Paris.

In addition to showing the internal colonizer, the colonized must also be shown, and even how that relationship can be traversed. Fanon (2009) shows us a view from the oppressed subject's perspective, where the colonized's inferiority complex has two roots: the economic and the internalization or epidermization of inferiority. In

academic institutions, including psychoanalytic ones, we desire to whiten ourselves, to have European approval, membership in some group authorized by them. In that eagerness, I turn to Fanon (1983) in his book *The Wretched of the Earth* when he says:

The world of the settler is a hostile world, which rejects, but at the same time it is a world that arouses envy. We have seen how the colonized always dreams of installing himself in the place of the settler. Not of becoming a settler, but of substituting the settler (Fanon, 1983, p. 25).

The psychoanalyst or academic intellectual accepted by one of those institutions headquartered in Europe or the United States will persecute those who are not members, placing them in the place of the profane, as the psychoanalytic institutions of the IPA since Freud or the Millerian AMP or its offspring have done. In this place, the colonized one day hopes to occupy the place of the ideal, that of the Lacanian, Marxist, or Foucauldian master. The latter is neither part of a desire to locate oneself in the place of the transhistorical colonizer, nor is it an individual psychological process, as Octave Mannoni (1990) also wanted to portray in his book *Prospero and Caliban: The Psychology of Colonization*, to which Fanon furiously responds. Mannoni's idea was that the colonized were waiting for the colonizers to be colonized, an idea that goes in the same direction that sustains that raped women were unconsciously waiting for the rapists to be raped. Michel Tort (2017), in an excellent text: "*Patriarchal Subjectivities: A Psychoanalysis Inserted into Historical Transformations*," places Mannoni as an example of a white colonizer.

I am not black, but to be in the place of a slave, one does not have to be black; it is enough to be Latin American, African, a worker, a woman, indigenous, a peasant, etc. And just like Fanon's black man, I may recognize my condition as a Latin American *mestizo*, but without admitting my psychic *mestizo* condition, and thus I avoid my Latin American *mestizo* condition by whitening my soul. Fanon knows that his clinical and psychoanalytic practice cannot be imaginarily confined to his consulting room, nor can he use the couch as a defense: "As a psychoanalyst, I must help my client make his unconscious conscious, to no longer attempt a lactification that is a hallucination, but I must also act in the direction of a change in social structures" (Fanon, 2009, p.103).

Language is not neutral; at least the Western world's language is racist. Not for nothing are the good, the pure, and the benevolent white, while the bad, the impure, and the evil are black. Not even the language in psychoanalytic institutions is neutral; its signifiers are crossed by power relations, idealizations that lead to the constitution of an analyst's ego. The point is not to be faithful to the Other from the imaginary, to be faithful to their teaching; anyone who tries to follow that path can only end up in the worst. It is as if the *mestizo* wanted to completely identify with the white European, in this case, the white European Freudian or Lacanian—that is an impossible illusion. The problem is that many psychoanalysts have wanted to transpose Freudian and later Lacanian psychoanalytic practice to a reality that has little or nothing to do with that Viennese or Parisian reality, hence the need to think about a practice for these Latin American contexts, not a Latin American psychoanalysis but a psychoanalysis *in* Latin America.

2.1. Choleando psychoanalysis

Just as the term *ch'ixi*, worked on by the Bolivian sociologist Rivera Cusicanqui, refers to something not previously determined as black or white, as inside or outside, but something that is and is not at the same time, breaking with binary logics. One could take the term *cholo*, used in Peru, for the same thing: that which is denigrated for not reaching the *mestizo* ideal to be white, the *cholo* from the Peruvian highlands who arrived in the capital Lima throughout the 20th century, the one who only came to serve. That discriminated against can be given a twist to convert that expelled, excluded thing into something where we recognize ourselves, and in this place, recognize our subalternity.

The psychoanalytic theory that we almost always read comes in texts written in French and English, and is largely translated in Buenos Aires and Mexico City. Those who translate these works have, in some way, been linked to Paris or London, and were trained in the psychoanalytic institutions of those cities or close to them, alongside the masters. Thus, when they return to their places of origin, they become the disseminators of their works. Thanks to them, we know their works, a job that must be valued; without them, it would have been very difficult for people like me to read Freud, Klein, Winnicott, Lacan, and others.

The *cholo* is that place which, for Quijano (1980), is in a state of transition, which is not and will not be: “the *cholo* group is not fully integrated into the 'modernized' or 'urban' sector of society, but is becoming a 'transition

culture" (p. 69). Therefore, we are all *cholos*; we will never be the white academics or the masters. We are going to *cholear* ourselves, to *cholear* psychoanalysis a little, and for that, we will turn to a *cholo*, an excluded one.

José Carlos Mariátegui was a Peruvian writer, journalist, and political thinker, also known as: "El Amauta" which in Quechua means "master." Among his best-known works is: "*7 Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality*." For some, he is considered "the most vigorous and original Marxist thinker that Latin America has ever known" (Lowy, 2007, p.17). For others, like the Peruvian psychoanalyst Saul Peña, Mariátegui is on the same path traced by Marx when he says: "The Peruvian thinker not only wants to interpret the world but also to transform it" (2017). Saul Peña himself writes that article where he finds that Mariátegui makes a use of psychoanalysis in extension, which makes it a valuable tool:

Marxism for Mariátegui is a kind of psychoanalysis of the socio-political spirit. Psychoanalysis gains surplus value when it extends to an extra-psychological territory. Mariátegui does Freudianism, not psychology, since social political thought is ideologized, deformed, according to him, through defense mechanisms (rationalization, substitution, displacement, sublimation) (Peña, 2017).

This Peruvian psychoanalyst has written a book entitled: "*Psychoanalysis of Corruption: Politics and Ethics in Contemporary Peru*," where he talks about violence, marginalization, the seduction of power, generalized corruption—uncommon themes for a psychoanalyst trained in the English IPA. But, apparently, it is not an isolated case of IPA psychoanalysis in Peru. In the late eighties and early

nineties of the 20th century, Cesar Rodríguez Rabanal had published the books: "*Scars of Poverty: A Psychoanalytic Study*" and "*The Violence of the Hours: Psychoanalytic Study on Violence in Peru.*" Another Peruvian psychoanalyst, Jorge Bruce, trained in the French IPA and a disciple of Green, comments in an interview conducted in 2007:

Psychoanalysis has taken refuge for many years in neutrality, in the theory that the psychoanalyst must be like a blank sheet, who should not have any strong position that could interfere with the patient's discourse. That is an increasingly untenable position. There are more and more people, like me, who speak out publicly. The refuge of neutrality is being abandoned, which, I believe, was a perfect alibi to avoid the problem of actively participating in public life, in the *polis*. My feeling is that the cautious and distant attitude of the observer is increasingly untenable. Reality increasingly demands pronouncements, and as I understand it, pronouncing not only as a citizen but with the tools that a psychoanalyst has. If he does not, he is committing an omission, something like not providing assistance to a society in danger (Sánchez-León, and Paredes-Oporto, 2007).

Consistent with the above, Bruce published a book in 2007 entitled: "*We had choleado ourselves so much (Nos habíamos choleado tanto),*" the first thing that strikes you about that title is the word *choleado*, which in Peru is associated with the indigenous person from the highlands, but which is currently related to anyone who is not white enough. Bruce follows the line worked on in Peru by the sociologist, also Peruvian, Gonzalo Portocarrero, on racism. For Bruce, psychoanalysis has to elaborate a saying about racism in Peru, especially questioning identification with the

dominant paradigm, something that reminds one of Fanon again, and which the Peruvian psychoanalyst, although not working on it directly, seems to reach a similar point by other paths.

Returning to Fanon (2009) and his book: "*Black Skin, White Masks*," he takes up Lacan's thesis and his doctoral thesis "*On Paranoiac Psychosis and its Relations with the Personality*," which serves him to support his psychic hypothesis from the repressor and the repressed:

We were talking a moment ago about Jacques Lacan. It was not by chance. In 1932, in his thesis, he made a violent critique of the notion of constitution. We apparently move away from his conclusions, but our disagreement will be understood when we remember that we substitute the notion of constitution, in the sense given to it by the French school, for that of structure, encompassing unconscious psychic life as we can partially know it, particularly in the form of the repressed and the repressor, inasmuch as these elements actively participate in the proper organization of each psychic individuality (Fanon, 2009, p.90).

This quote from Lacan serves Fanon as a preamble to what will be his strongest discussion in this book, the critique of Octave Mannoni; the former criticizes the latter for several things set out in the book published in 1950 and entitled: "*The Psychology of Colonization*." This criticism is directed at the justification of colonization caused by a colonized person's inferiority complex. Fanon quotes verbatim parts of the mentioned book and writes:

Not all peoples are fit to be colonized, only those who possess that need. And, further on: Almost everywhere where Europeans have founded colonies of the type that are currently being questioned, it can be said that they were expected and even desired in the unconscious of their subjects (p.102).

For Fanon, it is inconceivable that the colonized were waiting for the colonizer to justify their identification with that place, and he continues commenting on this:

When it comes to understanding why the European, the foreigner, was called *vazaha*, that is, "honorable foreigner"; when it comes to understanding why shipwrecked Europeans were welcomed with open arms, because the European, the foreigner, is never conceived as an enemy; instead of doing so from humanity, from welcome, from kindness, fundamental features of what Césaire calls the "old courteous civilizations," we are told that it is simply due to the fact that something was inscribed in the «fateful hieroglyphs» (in the unconscious in particular) that made the white man the awaited master. The unconscious, yes, is there. But one must not extrapolate. A black man tells me the following dream: "I have been walking for a long time, I am very tired, I have the feeling that something is waiting for me, I go through barriers and walls, I arrive at an empty room and, behind a door, I hear noise, I hesitate before entering, finally I decide, I enter and in that second room there are white people and I realize that I am white too." When I try to understand that dream, to analyze it, knowing that this friend has difficulties advancing, I conclude that this dream fulfills an unconscious desire. But when, outside my psychoanalyst's laboratory, it is a matter of integrating my conclusions into the context of the world, I will say:

1. My patient suffers from an inferiority complex. His psychic structure is in danger of dissolving. The aim is to preserve it and, little by little, to free him from that unconscious desire.

2. If he is immersed to this extent in the desire to be white, it is because he lives in a society that makes his inferiority complex possible, in a society that derives its consistency from the maintenance of that complex (Fanon, 2009, p.103).

The idea is not to return to a kind of autochthonous Latin American thought, nor to return to our roots, nor, as already mentioned, to a Latin American psychoanalysis. It is to found a psychoanalytic praxis in Latin America, hence the journey through Mariátegui and Fanon, among others—a praxis that accounts for our realities, and how these are constituted from the ideological unconscious, without essentialism from here or there, without imaginary returns to the original that have characterized certain schools or tendencies, as Fanon also tells us:

In other words, the black man should not find himself again before this dilemma: to whiten or to disappear, but must be able to become conscious of a possibility of existing; said in yet another way, if society poses difficulties for him because of his color, if I observe in his dreams the expression of an unconscious desire to change color, my objective will not be to dissuade him by advising him to «keep his distance»; my objective, on the contrary, will be, once the motives have been clarified, to put him in a position to choose action (or passivity) in the face of the true source of conflicts, that is, in the face of social structures (p.104).

Our destiny cannot be to whiten ourselves or disappear, so we do not have to resemble anyone in any center or institution in Europe or the United States. We must use our own resources—ancestral-indigenous, black, and European—beyond the resentment of reaction, as Fanon tells us, from the creation of the new to allow us to overcome oppressions. Why not think of a *prieto, naco* psychoanalysis, not to essentialize ourselves in those places, but to think of psychoanalytic practice from that subaltern position, from that excluded other, and not from the identification with an ideal white other, the one we will never be. Subalternizing psychoanalytic practice from the very thing that shames us, speaking French or English with an accent (not only the geographical one) but speaking them from here. Monsiváis (2002) in his book: "*Días de guardar*" says that:

Naco is the insult that one class directs at another and that—story of the years of fire—the offended themselves accept and brandish as an insult, being perfectly able to do so as self-praise, in the same way that German students self-qualify as "pigs" to sarcastically receive the bourgeois aggression (p.120).

A psychoanalytic practice from the fifth courtyard (*quinto patio*) should not be embarrassing. Subalternity is turning a less into a more, from the not-all (*no-todo*) of the feminine in Lacanian theory. It is not about a less that makes one envy what the other supposedly has: whiteness, knowledge, the phallus. What many imaginarily placed as less, the point is to convert that less into more, not from another imaginary identification, nor objectifying ..an object, much less ontologizing some essence. The not-all (*no-todo*) of the feminine, in Lacanian theory, does not refer to any lack or any deficiency; by being not-all subject to the phallic function, the logic of having and not having loses

its force. What is found is being without substance. The Lacanian subject is that void, so having is only an imaginary way of filling it, a being in negativization: "Only the subject can be that negativized real of a possible that is not real" (Lacan, 1961-1962).

2.2. A *Whitexicans* psychoanalysis⁷, No!: for a motley and *Naco* psychoanalysis⁸

A motley psychoanalysis (Gallo, 2021) could be said to be different from one produced by *whitexicans*. A motley psychoanalysis cannot be conceived for individuals who deny racism, misogyny, inequality, poverty, violence, and injustices, among other things that occur in our Latin American contexts.

A motley psychoanalysis is not for individuals who lament not being successful, *winners*, privileged, or advantaged, but precisely for those who have been excluded from those ideals consolidated in neoliberal capitalism in recent decades. This motley psychoanalytic practice is for those who are located on the limit, or trying to be Lacanian, for those who are located on the littoral, that place that has no defined form, a littoral that borders two heterogeneous forms, and that is what a motley psychoanalysis aims for.

⁷ The neologism 'whitexican' is used to refer to people of Mexican origin who identify as white or have light skin, and who, because of this, display attitudes of superiority and privilege.

⁸ Written as a result of the conference at Ludens on March 21, 2022, in Mexico City and published in Revista Lúdica Year 2, No. 3, January - April 2022, pages 67-71.

Listening to a subject and their place in relation to the Other is the commitment of a motley psychoanalytic practice, where neither the subject nor the Other are homogeneous, nor even substantial; both are inconsistent, hence neither can complete the other or self-complete. A subject is represented by one signifier before another signifier, but no signifier represents anything in itself. Thus, despite the identificatory illusion of the *whitexicans*, this is also another signifier that must resort to other signifiers to signify itself and locate itself as those "chosen" to be at the top of a society.

The *whitexicans* believe they can signify themselves in the ideal place of whiteness, and from that place, they believe that racism does not exist, that we are in a post-racial era, just as they also believe that we are in a post-political era where there is neither left nor right, and that the exercise of politics is a pragmatic issue for neutral technobureaucrats. A *whitexicans* psychoanalysis is one that presents itself as neutral listening, an issue where the political cannot enter, in a kind of zero point, where the analyst places themselves as the place of the Other who sees and hears everything, beyond their own place as a subject.

The subject for psychoanalysis is not an individual since it always refers to another; it is crossed by the social, it is located and locates itself there, from its unconscious phantasms, those that make us think, feel, perceive, and attend to the same reality. The *whitexicans* unconscious phantasm may be the same one that haunts certain populations in Latin America, who considered themselves direct heirs of the European conquerors and colonizers, those

same ones who deny that there were annihilations of ancestral peoples and slavery here. They even go so far as to say that they should be grateful because they brought civilization, and that without them, one could not be writing this or talking about psychoanalysis, even if it were motley. Yes, but they forget that: "one must dispense with the father on condition of making use of him" as Lacan (2006) told us, so it is not about worshiping him from an ideal of whiteness and locating oneself there, exactly as Echeverría (2010) proposes.

A *whitexicans* psychoanalysis denies not only reality but the subject itself, locating it in a kind of individuality where it is always guilty of its destiny for being poor (the poor is poor because they want to be), or that they can be guilty of being a victim of rape or even of getting a job, in a kind of psychoanalytic meritocracy using subjective responsibility as a wild card to justify all these situations. Thus, racism and historical social inequities are whitewashed, normalizing those individual places. A motley psychoanalysis is *naco*. The latter, for a researcher like Carlos Monsiváis in "*Días de guardar*," means that which is:

Within the language of discrimination *a la mexicana*, it is equivalent to proletarian, lumpenproletariat, poor, sweaty, greasy hair and a high quiff, the profile of a village headman, dressed in six-month-old fashion..., the *naco* is the dark midnight cravings (Monsiváis, 2002, p.120).

Psychoanalysis is motley and *naco*. While I write this, from the *Colonia Condesa*, where everything works so well that it seems not to be in Mexico or Latin America, but we must not be fooled, the slum exists to remind us that that

perfection in those places is only a parcel, a limited space, and that the other places are slums. Monsiváis in "*Escenas de pudor y liviandad*" reminds us that the slum is: That which is naturally far from the advantages and respectability of society, where tragedies are more real and the poor know the happiness of suffering denied to the rich (Monsiváis, 2004, p.80).

Motley psychoanalysis can be located in the fifth courtyard without shame, although also in Condesa, or better, Polanco (neighborhoods associated with privilege); the important thing is not the place but what is done with it. When Monsiváis talks about *Naco* self-praise, he is not referring to placing oneself in the *cantinflesco* place of a harmless "lowlife" who amuses everyone, including the privileged, nor to the fixed identificatory place of the unprivileged. Motley psychoanalysis is not pure, if that ever existed; it is not imaginarily circumscribed to a consulting room where the medical semblance of power over a patient prevails. Hence, it is mixed, without defined color. The term *mestizo* is not used here because, for some who have worked on the subject, like the Bolivian sociologist Cusicanqui, *mestizo* has been the place that many took to deny the indigenous and the black to whiten themselves, in order to try to reach the ideal of whiteness, and psychoanalytic practice does not escape that ideal; for some, there is only one way to do psychoanalysis, a pure one, the clinical one, the one done in Paris or any place of privilege.

Motley psychoanalysis is a vindication, just like the *naco*; it is done from here without longing for what they do there or what they are there. That does not mean that what they do

there should be excluded, as long as it serves us here, for the phenomena and problems here. "I am motley" does not mean something concrete or refer to an essence; one must not ontologize again, nor return to the imaginary identifications that want to maintain historical privileges, which is why they want to sustain things as they are and as they supposedly are, because nothing happens and everything seems normal: they are there in their privileges and the others in their misfortunes. A motley psychoanalysis was thought for these last ones who are located on the limit, that is, in the place of the subject of the unconscious, those whom Freud listened to when he created psychoanalysis, those women who were excluded in imperial Victorian Vienna.

There is a book that I did not know until writing this text, that book is titled: "*The Naco in the Caste Country*" by Enrique Serna. In a fragment of the text, he says:

The day Mexico begins to emerge from underdevelopment, the first symptom of economic progress will be a greater preponderance of the *naco* in national life. But experience shows that, in this caste country, when we have had glimpses of prosperity, the very group promoting the capitalist take-off repudiates the incorporation of the marginalized into the consumer society. For good and bad reasons (aristocratic disdain for the masses, horror of the popular subculture, hope for a chimerical revolution that will restore the people's lost identity), the holders of cultural and economic power have decided that *nacos* should not exist. The problem is that without them, the country does not exist either. The silent war against the *naco* prevents any attempt at modernization, but can also lead us to a cultural suicide. Creative stagnation is already evident, both in the field of

popular music and in the realm of fine letters (Serna, 2001, p. 753).

For the historian of psychoanalysis Roudinesco (Bassets, 2019), psychoanalysis has become a therapy for the rich, for the privileged, hence the practice of psychoanalysis has more future here, in the country of *nacos/nacas* in Mexico, *neas* and *ñeros/as* in Colombia, *villeros/as* in Argentina, or *cholos/cholas* in Peru, because a psychoanalysis for the rich is a psychoanalysis for the few, which is condemned to disappear. Psychoanalysis will be for the excluded, or it will not be. This is how Freud created psychoanalysis, with the excluded women of his time, those women who did not want to adapt to Victorian norms, and consequently were subjected to a standardized regime where medicine, instead of listening to them, labeled them as hysterical madwomen. Psychoanalysis has more possibilities in Latin America than in other places, for the excluded people here, who are the majority, and for the excluded people there, for the *nacos* here, not because they identify imaginarily from the superego imperatives: "you are *naco*," but because using the word *naco* opens up other possibilities.

Enrique Serna's book reminded me of another book by the Peruvian psychoanalyst Jorge Bruce (2008), following the paths traced by Mariátegui, this book titled: "*We had choleado ourselves so much*" describes the characteristics of racism in Peru, racism in its daily life, just as Freud did his "*Psychopathology of Everyday Life*." Bruce does it from the place of the *cholo*, that subject who cannot reach the ideal of whiteness and is rejected. Currently, that ideal has been knotted to another aspirational and arriviste signifier like that

of the entrepreneur, so the *cholo* would be like the *naco*: “the one who is not”.

Fortunately, for psychoanalysis, it is not that successful, winning, triumphant individual that it aims at, but a subject. What we are not turns us into a potency, in the best manner of Guattari and Deleuze taking up Spinoza, just as it also turns psychoanalytic practice into a possibility. What we are not is what can enable us, and this can be done from here, drinking *caguamas* (large bottles of beer) and listening to *Los Ángeles Azules*, since the issue is not the *caguama* or a cigar in some Parisian café, trying to reach an illusory place of the psychoanalyst. The important thing here is that something can be done with what happens in the motley psychoanalytic practice, a psychoanalysis possible in every context, a practice where a subject can emerge.

Comedy is subversive because it dissolves the completeness of both the Other and oneself. Being able to laugh at the Other as well as at oneself opens up the possibility of something yet to be created, of something always to-be-made.

2.3. Motleying Psychoanalysis, Traversing its Coloniality to Link Differently

In the municipal theater of the city of Bogotá, on May 21, 1920, the Colombian doctor Miguel Jiménez López presented his thesis according to which the Colombian population was undergoing a process of degeneration caused by the negative influence of the tropical environment and the

vices of an inherited biological deterioration that led the majority of the population in this country to be degenerates.

The most desirable product for regenerating our population is one that meets, as far as possible, these conditions: white race, height and weight slightly superior to the average among us; dolichocephalic; of harmonious body proportions; in whom a facial angle of approximately eighty-two degrees dominates; of proportionate features to neutralize our tendency to prognathism and the excessive development of the cheekbones; sanguine-nervous temperament, which is especially suitable for inhabiting the heights and torrid localities; of recognized practical gifts; methodical for different activities; skilled in manual labor; of great development in their voluntary power; little emotive; little refined; of old work habits; tempered in their outbursts, by a long discipline of government and morality; a race in which the home and the institution of the family maintain a solid and respected organization; suitable and strong for agriculture; sober, economical, and enduring and constant in their enterprises. These would be the most desirable conditions, although, as is obvious to see, it is not so easy to find them combined in any people. I believe, however, that the races that most closely approximate this *desideratum* are some of those that populate the central regions of Europe, in which the characters of the southern and northern peoples of the Old Continent have been happily mixed and tempered. In Switzerland, in Belgium, in Holland, in Bavaria, in Württemberg, in Tyrol it would be correct to seek the personnel for our immigration. The Basques, the Irish, and the Bretons, and perhaps also the inhabitants of the Scandinavian countries, would also be very appropriate elements for our soil, due to their

physiological and moral conditions (Muñoz, 2011, p.100-101).

The ideas of this doctor influenced Law 114 of 1922 on immigration and agricultural colonies where the following was stipulated:

ARTICLE 10. In order to promote the economic and intellectual development of the country and the improvement of its ethnic conditions, both physical and moral, the Executive Power will encourage the immigration of individuals and families who, due to their personal and racial conditions, cannot or should not be a cause for precautions regarding social order or the indicated purpose, and who come with the purpose of working the land, establishing new industries or improving existing ones, introducing and teaching sciences and arts, and in general, who are elements of civilization and progress. ARTICLE 11. Immigration agents will not endorse any passport for immigrants who fall into any of the cases specified in Law 48 of 1920, nor for individuals who, due to ethnic conditions, are a cause for precautions in Colombia. The entry into the country of elements who, due to their ethnic, organic, or social conditions, are inconvenient for the nationality and for the better development of the race is prohibited. (Cancillería, 1922).

It is striking in this law that foreigners are the elements that will bring civilization and progress. This appeal to the improvement of the race by means of the importation of white people against *mestizo* degeneration was able to be sustained in many Latin American countries through the ideal of whiteness (Echeverría, 2010), which

resulted in the extermination of indigenous and black populations, in order to ensure the necessary balance and development. The savage had to be eliminated, the symptom of underdevelopment, and the way to do it was by importing whiteness; the whiter, the more human, and thus more developed.

Whiteness, for Echeverria, places the ideal from a superiority compared to the non-white as devalued; it is the ugly, the undesirable, the small, the little; it is the negation of the subject. The waste and the garbage. For the Martinican psychiatrist Fanon (2015), there is: "a zone of non-being, an extraordinarily sterile and arid region, an essentially stripped ramp, from which an authentic emergence can be born" (p.42). Although Fanon was talking about the condition of the black man in colonized French Martinique, we can continue to think that, in the different Latin American contexts, those of us who live in them also have the same destiny as the black man, according to Fanon: that to affirm our human subjectivity, we have to deny that which dehumanizes us: the motley body. The motley, a term coined by the Bolivian sociologist Zavaleta (1986), is that which has no fixed or unitary identity; various temporalities can converge there; it is something that can be all things without being none, thus all things and none at the same time, even partial, or rather, in the saying of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory: not-all (Gallo, 2021).

Faced with the master signifier of whiteness, the subject in the colony positions themselves as a non-subject. Faced with the great colonial Other, all that was left to us was non-being. Here, the colonized located themselves as

that rejected object, but at the same time fundamental to sustaining that colonial Other, faced with the ideal of white identity, total identity, a place with which one had to identify to be able to be something, because not-being becomes a subversive act. Here, not-being makes it possible to break with that colonial Other, seeking a way out that is neither to denigrate that Other nor to unconsciously identify with it, those two paths led to colonial misery.

Attachment to whiteness is the opposite path to antagonizing coloniality; it is there that not being white can lead to positioning oneself in an empty place, which breaks with the place of the colonial Other, which is why in that place one cannot long for that which is not lacking to be in order to achieve that whiteness, which is why the void needs to be radically emptied.

The psychoanalytic approach helps us not only to remember coloniality but also to explain the way it has operated on the subject. Our damaged colonial subjectivity is the product of complex unconscious relational operations of the type traditionally studied by psychoanalysis. Such is the case of the operation described by Frantz Fanon as internalization or "epidermization of inferiority," as the "inferiorization" of the non-European correlative to the "superiorization" of the European. It is also the case of Europeanization as an "aspiration" in Quijano, that is, "internal colonialism" as a substitute for "external" colonialism, the "seduction" that comes after the "repression." Perhaps none of this could have even been conceived without the Freudian sensibility that subtly permeates current critical thought, including postcolonial, decolonial, and anti-colonial thought. What is certain is that the critique of coloniality can take advantage of

psychoanalysis to explain many of the most insidious, subtle, and buried colonial operations (Pavón Cuellar, 2020).

If our *mestizaje* was a failed act, a symptom, it is necessary to elaborate a know-how with it, to make of that object something different from suffering, to pass from the symptom to the *sinthome*. The symptom that brings suffering can be transformed into a new subjectivity that is not the response to the demands and debts of the Other, an invention of a new place, the invention of a new signifier. Being *mestizo* will no longer be the place of not-being, as it can convert that not-being into a possibility of being. In that *sinthome*, the object *a* will come to occupy the place of the void, not plugging it up, but precisely signaling that empty place. Being *mestizo*, motley, is an artifice that creates that not-being, in that failed act as a possibility of being. In that insignificant place, of that motley *mestizo*, Argentine *villero*, Peruvian *Cholo*, Colombian *ñero*, or Mexican *naco*, there is something that is born from nothingness to be something; in that inferiorized identificatory precariousness, the desire that makes the subject emerge can be sustained.

We must traverse the colonial phantasm that has constituted us for centuries, and for that, we also need to create listening devices, of that subject, that make it possible for those subalterns who have not been able to speak to speak. We must remind ourselves that the colonized "cannot speak," as Spivak (2003) rightly pointed out. To recognize ourselves as subjects capable of speaking and being heard, that our theoretical inquiries can be read not only here but also there, that we achieve recognition for our texts as such.

It is not about speaking for those who cannot, but about sustaining spaces so that subjects can elaborate a saying about themselves and others, a saying that allows them to create other possibilities, other places, other worlds. We are not totally determined; there is always a gap, a hole, a not-all that allows us to construct, to create other ways of living.

We can never become like the other from the European North or the United States, so the only thing we can do is submit to them, obey them, and in the best of cases, long for them to notice us, and thus be blessed with their approach, as a way of whitening ourselves and beginning the path of our completeness. A motley psychoanalysis is the only possible psychoanalysis in Latin American spaces. Psychoanalysis, by proposing the subject of the unconscious, proposes a dis-identification, which would be an attack on the individual ego, an instance that is constituted precisely by identifications, in our case, rooted around coloniality and submission to the ideal of whiteness.

Another psychic and phantasmal reality must be elaborated, knotting them and weaving them to escape those identity ideals that pretend to achieve what, supposedly, they are: whiter, more intelligent, better looking, taller, richer, more psychoanalysts, more and more. The first thing we have to recognize is that subjectivity is inscribed in configurations of power from the social, and for that, it must also sustain a listening that takes into account that the subject is not apolitical; on the contrary, it is constituted around an empty space that is the political, and its subjective manifestations are produced in politics; that is, the political is of the real and politics is of the imaginary and symbolic,

hence the imaginary-symbolic intersection is phantasmal, as a response to the void of the real political.

Politics is the attempt to symbolize the traumatic Real of the political (Gallo, 2020, p. 207), just as white identity is the veil that tries, through the imaginary and symbolic, to account for the subject empty of the real, behind the ideal of whiteness to a void, which not only concerns the *mestizo* or motley but also the white ideal itself. Even *mestizo* identity was used as a springboard to reach the ideal of whiteness; not locating oneself as *mestizo* was a way of denying the black and the indigenous. *Mestizaje* was used on many occasions so that everything would fit and function harmoniously, denying the social antagonisms that manifested through racism, classism, and machismo.

By dissolving the negative connotations of racial and social mixing, most intellectuals gradually dissolve discriminatory categorizations, so that everything seems to fit harmoniously around the construction of the nation and the integration of different races through *mestizaje*. In the attempt to understand that positive unity that is vividly expressed throughout the set of Latin American countries (Chaparro, 2019, p. 177).

The *mestizo* denies the black and indigenous other; it was the way Latin American identities wanted to fix themselves in the ideal of whiteness, forgetting that the antagonistic is creative. Instead of denying these antagonisms, what must be done is to recognize them, and for that, the *mestizo* has been conceived as an obstacle, which is why the motley is rescued not only by Echeverría but also by Rivera Cusicanqui (2018), placing the *mestizo* in a schizoid situation. For this

researcher, her proposal is from a *ch'ixi* epistemology which "literally refers to speckled gray, formed from an infinity of black and white points that unify for perception, but remain pure, separate" (Rivera Cusicanqui, 2015, p. 310). The *ch'ixi* is a coexistence of contradictory elements to organize a world. Combination, interweaving, braids that allow us to construct ourselves from the *ch'ixi*, the motley, beyond the *mestizo*, the identities that try to fix us, and the ideals that try to trap us.

To welcome those opposites is to braid them, to link them without fusing them, like in a less foolish love proposed by the French psychoanalyst Lacan, one that links the non-linkable. For Rivera Cusicanqui, the *mestizo* must be decolonized, and for this writing, psychoanalysis must be decolonized, the psychoanalyst must be decolonized. To achieve this goal, the ideal of the psychoanalyst must be deconstructed. Paradoxically, the very people who try to sustain the illusion in a psychoanalytic purity, as well as the ideal of whiteness, appealing to Lacan, forget that the psychoanalyst does not exist as Miller (1998) rightly states:

The analyst does not exist: it is a formulation that deserves some theoretical developments. It means that The analyst does not exist, which does not prevent the existence of analysts. It means that there is no concept of analyst, no essence of analyst, no idea, and in that sense, analysts can represent the Other (barred) (p. 515).

Rather, the psychoanalyst, the place they occupy, is that of not-all, the place of the feminine, or the psychoanalyst is *ch'ixi* or motley, and the first thing that must be done is to de-idealize that place, de-identify it, de-

essentialize it. It is there that a psychoanalytic practice can be thought of as decolonial, without purities, without authorities that say what is or what is not, as if it were a matter of setting authorizations and quality controls. From here, the ego is deconstructed, and the superego is left without its normative and imperative frame. From the closed nature of the ego ordered by the superego, the subject would always be open to being, to the possibility of being. Is that not the Lacanian speaking-being (*hablanteser*), a subject who is implicated with their body in language? Therefore, that speaking-being has to deal with their desire, with their *jouissance*, with their (non)being.

A *ch'ixi* or motley psychoanalysis would be a psychoanalysis to link differently, just as it is about doing something else with the political that is not mere politicking. There, the *sinthome* ceases to be a symptom, there where we let go of the melancholic longing for what we can never become—whiteness—in order to be that which we are not.

2.4. From *jouissance* to desire in *bacano* and motley psychoanalysis

Jouissance is positivity; the more positivity, the more *jouissance*. The excess of positivity, in Chul Han's terms, would be the *jouissance* of neoliberal capitalism. Borders are necessary; without borders, the anxiety of an all ensues. Thus, bordering would be a way of doing something with the void so that the all of anxiety—which leaves us in a devastating nothingness—does not overwhelm us. Therefore: let us border the real of life.

The dilemma of desire is that it can only be possible in its impossibility, as Simone Weil tells us in her book *On Desire*:

Desire unsatisfied, insatiable in itself. In the impossibility of satisfying it lies its truth (...) If we pay attention to it, every desire, satisfied (relatively) or not, is a path toward non-satisfaction. Then immense cries arose, and all beings, and all desires (Weil, 2023, p.36-37).

We must think of a psychoanalytic praxis outside of itself, unhinged, undisciplined, subverted from that dominant elitist, classist, sexist, racist order. Kaziyađu, in the Huitoto language, means awakening, the dawn of a new day, the one that calls us to live before we die, to a doing with life, with that real that we have to link with the symbolic and imaginary of a ternary invented by Lacan. That would be thinking of a *bacano*, motley, other psychoanalytic experience.

A *bacano* psychoanalysis is an ethically committed praxis, different from a mode of defense against the generalized anxiety that arises from cynical indifference—the nothing is happening here—from a somber seriousness, serious because it is in series. The proposal is a *bacano* psychoanalysis where we have the right to laugh and to enjoy (*gozar*), a right that makes the subject dignified, the right to revolt against their tragic destiny: "Laughter, immense and delicious *jouissance*, all *jouissance* (...) Laughter belongs, originally, to the devil" (Kundera, 2003).

A psychoanalytic praxis where love makes us recognize the void: "We can only love in the void" as Simón

Weil tells us. To make love a politics is simply to recognize that the radical alterity of the other is a limit for me and for that other, and that these are not obstacles but ways of creating companies linked by desire.

There is no age to stop insisting, there is no age to stop persisting. The struggle, as Freud tells us, is between that death drive and the life drive. Therefore, every day is a battle to invent new ways of living amidst a death that stalks with its *jouissance*; it is a struggle to create by living. We have been made to believe that reality is something immutable and natural, and what the loving act shows us is that it is something that can not only transform but also transform us. Love, as Lacan tells us, is a change of discourse where a subject can locate themselves in other places, in other possibilities. The important thing for desire is not its object but the persistence in achieving it. It is there that desire is traced, in the second, because the first is always an impossible that brings impotence, the second, an always creative possibility of reaching something that is never fully achieved. Freedom is only achieved with the other; what they call freedom today is nothing more than an individualistic solitary *jouissance*. Only the bond with the other can allow freedom; only when hands are intertwined can we feel that the other accompanies us from their freedom with ours.

The unconscious is what makes us human, and it is the last thing that will resist the control of the ideals of neoliberal capitalism. Life is playing; the more one plays, the less one suffers. Play creates the possibility of no place too serious, too in series; it always creates the possibility of

being able to be. There, suffering gives way to being something else. A psychoanalysis should lead to a know-how to laugh, a know-how to love, and a know-how to live.

Going through psychoanalysis is facing the courage of telling oneself a truth, and locating oneself as a subject to sustain the desire for a path to travel. Relinking in the face of the non-existence of the other who fulfills—that would be the jubilee of psychoanalytic praxis. New signifiers must be invented that create paths to enable the installation of desires. Relinking is making the bond be knotted in other ways that do not call for a tether, creating, hosting, sustaining-being by sustaining the other.

There is a poetics of hospitality, a poetics that implies creating, and this is proposed by Derrida and Dufourmantelle (2000) in their book *Of Hospitality*: "One cannot open the process of hope without simultaneously establishing that of love. An act of hospitality can only be poetic" (p.10). Poetics is not only about finding words that rhyme; poetry is creation, the ability to imagine possible worlds, which is why it is a poetic act that enables discourses that attempt and seek to transform the given world. And this possibility can begin to be constituted with hospitality.

One hosts an other who comes as a foreigner. We must remember that in Greek, *xénos* is both guest and foreigner, from which the word enemy in Latin is also known as *hospes* and *hostis*. This is important not only for psychoanalysis but for all human sciences, since to host, one needs a self-emptying; the first foreigner is oneself. Thus, to receive oneself, one needs the gift of establishing an absence

to sustain a presence. That is why an openness is necessary, a place not only to shelter but to host, these are exits and entrances that are built around that openness, a border that allows us to exit and enter.

The invitation is to be hospitable, to sustain hospitality, to go toward that border where we have to reconnect with the strange, toward the unknown, the unexpected. Today we are hosts, but at the same time, we are guests of our own house; welcoming ourselves into that house is a prior act to being its hosts. We can only house the other if we have first been able to house ourselves, in that Freudian sentence in the text "*A Difficulty in the Path of Psycho-Analysis*" where he tells us:

That the instinctual life of sexuality in us cannot be fully tamed, and that psychic processes are unconscious in themselves, becoming accessible and submitting to the ego only through an incomplete and suspicious perception, are equivalent to asserting that the ego is not the master of its own house. Both, together, represent the third affront to self-love which I would call psychological (Freud, 1992b, p.135).

We must always keep this sentence in mind, not only to decenter that individual ego that neoliberal capitalism has almost completely managed to colonize, but to understand that we are not only not the master of our own house, but that we are always guests of the Other from Lacanian psychoanalysis.

Hosting the other opens up the possibility of recognizing ourselves first; welcoming the other is a gift that

allows us to welcome ourselves in order to question our own knowledge, our certainties, our securities. Hopefully, this invitation and hospitality is today just that: pure self-care (*pura inquietud de sí*) as Foucault told us and what psychoanalysis should always bet on, a poetic self-care, one that enables the subject to transform their world with the other.

From the structural lack evidenced in a void that cannot be filled by any European identity, nor indigenous, nor black, there the *mestizo* cannot be the identity object to resort to to fill that structural void. The subject is the failure to fill that void, so neither European, nor black, nor indigenous, nor *mestizo*, we are the failure of any identification, because we cannot positivize that void with any identification. The subaltern proposal is not to fill that void either, but to show the void itself. The subaltern is another attempt to essentialize the subject, although some want to achieve it, from the failure of all identification, and it is here that psychoanalysis, as a psychoanalytic and political experience, has its reason for being. But Lacan himself warns that those attempts by some psychoanalysts to want to return to seeking the essence of the subject where:

They will also find how to preserve themselves from the psycho-sociological objectification where the psychoanalyst, in his uncertainties, goes to seek the substance of what he does, it being the case that he can only provide him with an inadequate abstraction where his practice gets bogged down and dissolved (Lacan, 1997, p.418).

Lacan introduced a conception of the subject that does not reduce to a psychological essence (Stavrakakis, 2007). And the subaltern proposal goes along that path of the Lacanian subject, hence a subaltern psychoanalysis is possible as the future of psychoanalysis itself.

Desire is waiting, it is the patience of bordering the void that allows an object to emerge to signal the impossibility of filling that void that caused it. Lacan (1976-1977) in Seminar 24 tells us that "Unconscious knowledge has a relationship with love" and in Seminar 25: "Analysis consists in knowing why one is entangled in that" (Lacan, 1977-1978). Thus, analysis is a knowledge that unravels the entanglements of life by knotting itself to love.

A psychoanalytic experience without politics and without a social context is only a moral policing practice, where what must be done is indicated in the name of an idealized technique. What is psychoanalysis for if not to construct a gay science (*gay saber*), a joyful knowledge, a joyful life that allows recreating a living that is threatened with the worst? This joyful knowledge allows us to face these threats from a possibility of it can still be, from some possibility of living. Knowledge (*Saber*) and flavor have the same root, *sapere*; only when one knows can one savor life in another way.

Writers have shown us that we are nothing more than characters in a play, we are a family novel as Freud described it, characters in a novel told by others, and that we will have to make our own to rewrite it. That is what going through a psychoanalysis is about, rewriting a novel that has

already passed, but that insists on not stopping passing so as to rewrite it. The psychoanalytic revolution invented by Freud introduced the non-existence of an inside or an outside, an exterior and interior, normal or abnormal. This broke with the dichotomies that have founded Western thought for many centuries, those that caused the human psyche to be constituted with the morality of good and evil, and to think that this psyche from the unconscious cannot be locatable in dichotomous places, but in complex spaces, unclassifiable poetic surfaces.

There is a theory of an Argentine streamer "Luquitas" Rodríguez, where he proposes that the Colombian football player plays well or badly, according to his state of mind, regardless of whether he is playing the final of an important cup or not. And the last example would be Daniel Muñoz in the Copa América semi-final against Uruguay, playing one of his best games, as a Copa América lateral, he gets sent off for an unnecessary elbow to a Uruguayan player. It is worth considering this theory to think that the Colombian football player does not deviate from the Colombian "being." Without entering into essentialisms, there is something cultural about the Colombian; we are passionate, impulsive to the extreme, who do not care if we destroy "everything" just to get what we want. The problem is that what we want is not what we desire on many occasions. To desire, we need pauses, times, that is, we need context. In Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, it would be needing to link the imaginary, the symbolic, and the real to be able to locate ourselves in the face of life in the best way, a know-how, and that, no matter how much impetus, impulse, or strength, is not enough most of the time. Therefore, if the Colombian

football player played understanding his context, he could not only do the wonders that arise from his strength and impetus once in a while, but he could make his game something much more powerful and constant; he would win many more things than he has achieved so far. The path of desire is not only of strength but of patience and constancy.

Desire is not that which fulfills us, nor is it even that object that satisfies us; it is a restless summons to try to reach what we never finish finding, and that traces the path for us to continue trying something that will never be achieved, but that in the end makes us live. Faced with that, the fantasy arises of being able to account for what one does not have and will never have, but that makes us create to live.

For the writer Irene Vallejo primitive humans were able to decipher symbols in the reality they saw and lived: distinguishing animals on the distant horizon, recognizing a bird slipping on the slides of the wind, interpreting the signs of the landscape, and identifying the tracks of other living beings on the earth. In some way, we already read before reading. That is why living is returning to rewriting what we read.

Today we are too tired to fantasize, exhausted to create, worn out to love, hence we have to settle for accepting and adapting to a reality that exhausts us. Desire is doing something with the void that is not nothingness; that is why a path is traced where that something is never reached, it is a path that is never finished traveling, and that is what makes living possible. Everyone will find the ways to travel

it, which is why, from desire, it is like style: the worst thing is not having one, since without that there is no path, much less a journey to make.

Saying is the attempt to reach a something so as not to remain in nothingness, in not being anything. That saying borders with every word, but also with every silence, the void that constitutes us as subjects. We are subjects who use words and their silences to be able to elaborate a saying that accounts for that void so as not to be nothing.

Politics is the governance of alterity. Psychoanalytic praxis is what allows one to listen to radical alterity. For Vegh, feeling is: "the imaginary dimension of affect" (Vegh 2003, p. 7), passion as that which happens when "the feeling consumes the subject to the extreme" (2003, p. 8). The cultural battle today is in the signifiers and affects, for example, how the signifiers liberty or university affect subjects, among them young people, students, teachers, affecting the body. Thus, this cultural battle is about how to make room for these signifiers that affect subjects, how to listen to them, how to sustain social bonds in that listening that do not take the path of destructive hatred, hence all psychoanalytic listening is a political act of love, because it enables the social bond with another who also affects us. Liberty and university, two signifiers that are at stake in the cultural battle today, which affect the bodies of subjects. Listening to them from psychoanalysis would be the way to lovingly link them and prevent them from becoming destructive hatreds—that is the political commitment of the psychoanalytic act of listening: a commitment to love.

The clamor is a voice that demands to be heard. In times when many things make noise to be silenced, converting those clamorous demands into demands of love (*amor*) would be to enable the discourse of the analyst, to pass from clamor to love. Wouldn't that be living up to the subjectivity of the era? For Lacan (1976-1977) in Seminar 24, "Love is nothing more than a signification," "love is void." Thus, love has nothing to do with a meaning, but with what is yet to be done and never finishes being filled with a sign, before which, the only thing left for us is to border it, weave it, link it with another.

The subject is of the feminine, it is a void that allows the reproduction of subjectivities. Current capitalism has taken that feminine condition of the subject to produce subjectivities identified with nothing by wanting the all. The commitment of psychoanalytic praxis, on the contrary, points to that feminine of the subject, enabling creation from a know-how to do with that void, opening the possibility for a subject to form a bond with another.

Auster, the writer of an increasingly nihilistic city, but as in a psychoanalysis (to which he was adept) wrote through his characters a fight against that nothingness, inventing a solitude with others, eroticizing a void to save himself from the nothingness of the hyper-production of objects. As a subversive act, there is a subject who speaks so that another listens to them; it is there that there is a possibility. What Auster tells us makes us think that solitude can also be accompanied, and what he did was to make his solitude something to accompany through his letters; in a

world full of things, emptying them through writing would be an option.

Capitalism does not trap desire; desire is untrappable. What it does is make us believe that through *jouissance*, it is capturable, so we *gozar* believing that we desire. Only, the more we *gozar*, the less we desire, and thus between one *jouissance* and another we lose ourselves as subjects under the illusion of a mortiferous *jouissance* that distances us from the path of desire, therefore, it distances us from life.

It is as if one *goza* of nothing. Gozar of nothingness is a current tendency; that is what depression is about. Faced with the impossibility of desire, the all *jouissance* appears, which in the end leaves nothing. For Tomšič (2023), the step from clinical singularity to political universality is the step from the politics of segregationist identity for some to the politics of communist non-identity for all, but the issue is also to think of the latter as a not-all, a communal politics from the not-all. Freud (1992c) in "*New Paths in Psychoanalytic Therapy*":

When that happens, we will be faced with the task of adapting our technique to the new conditions. (...) And it is also very probable that in the application of our therapy to the masses we will be forced to alloy the pure gold of analysis with the copper of direct suggestion (...) But whatever the future form of this psychotherapy for the people, and no matter what elements finally constitute it, there is no doubt that its most effective and important ingredients will remain those that it takes from rigorous psychoanalysis (p. 163).

A *bacano* and popular psychoanalysis is a psychoanalysis for everyone who demands it; it is not for some, it is not for all, it is a communal not-all that gives space to the singularity of a subject in community. Courage and dignity are what sustain psychoanalytic praxis, courage to listen to the subject of the unconscious, and dignity for the emergence of this subject, courage and dignity, two acts that seem to dissolve in the era where everything can be bought and sold. There is something that says not everything can, and that is the subject, that which signals that in impossibility something can be created, in the excluded something can be done. The subject is that something that is not all but also nothing, it is the emergence of something beautiful about to happen, about to occur, and psychoanalytic praxis is the place of that possibility.

Lacan tells us that "the only thing one can be guilty of is having yielded in one's desire." And there we are, guilty, impotent to walk the path of desire, incapable of assuming the real of life, entangled with a *jouissance* that brings us suffering that feeds itself and does not enable life. The importance of words is not only in the words themselves but between them, and it is there that listening is located, between word and word, in that which words cannot say, in that which they cannot say by saying.

Psychoanalytic praxis should be guided more by a political and ethical position (erotology), than by a rigid, standardized technique, ready to be verified by a psychoanalytic morality. The real threat to psychoanalysis is its depoliticization and neutrality in the face of threats to the subject of the unconscious, to the non-listening to their

suffering and discomforts, to their protests and strikes, which are nothing other than that which resists being trapped: the subject of the unconscious itself. We must return to placing subjective sufferings in their rightful place, subjective protests against the prevailing morality in each era. Just as hysteria was the strike through the body against Victorian morality, depression and anxiety would be the protests against the imperatives of neoliberal capitalism where we all have to be happy and productive.

The more the subject yields their desire to the ideals of neoliberal capitalism, the more their subjectivity will be affected by different responses ranging from depression to anxiety, passing through substance abuse. Community joy points to collectives, associations, community bonds; all those ties serve to welcome those discomforts, to house subjects and their suffering. Individual happiness is quite the opposite of community joy. The latter is a party with others, it is an accompanying in solitudes, it is the possibility of listening to each other's discomforts and sufferings. In contrast, the former is only solitary narcissism monetized by the neoliberal capitalist ideals of self-love or self-realization, where only one's own success and triumph over others has a place.

We must politicize discomfort, suffering. Politicizing a psychoanalytic praxis has to do with listening to the subject's sufferings, they do not have to do with an internal conflict, nor with something external, but the symptomatic manifestations are subjective responses to the superego imperatives of an era, of the sexual morality that Freud spoke of, the Lacanian Other. It is not an individualistic issue

often disguised as "neutral clinical practice"; it is a subject's position with respect to desire and *jouissance*. Politicizing the analytic act is making the subject a place that is always subversive, revolutionary, emancipatory, transformative; that is, it would make psychoanalysis a *bacano* act, so do not yield to a *bacano* psychoanalysis.

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In this sense, Baccano Psychoanalysis would also be a resistance to the colonization of psychoanalytic theory by the North, and what the author does is summon us to consider the ways in which we were colonized in psychoanalysis, placing France and Europe in the place of the colonizer, and French psychoanalysis in the place of truth, as an ideal to be achieved. Traditional psychoanalysis itself, which sets out to criticize movements that use identity strategically in politics, succumbs to the tyrannical superego that limits psychoanalytic praxis to the language and texts of the matrix; it criticizes science at the same time that it puts the text of the master psychoanalysts in its place. In conclusion, when Jairo's Baccano psychoanalysis reminds us that we are dealing with desire, and that this is movement, we revisit its dancing potential, which invokes the joyful creation of the act, against the neoliberal melancholy that paralyzes. Here in Latin America, we dance, we fight, and at the same time, we play with diverse rhythms. We create our Borromean knot between race, class, and gender in a unique synthome of psychoanalysis in our territory, with the richness of regional flavors, the beauty of tropical colors, and the ebb and flow of our music, which from South to North keeps us moving

Aline Souza Martins

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